The dual-class share structure is a model that effectively segregates cash flow rights from control rights. Its primary purpose is to safeguard the control rights of the founding team and fortify resistance against hostile takeovers. Nonetheless, according to agency theory, the dual-class structure may intensify agency problems, potentially compelling managers to resort to heightened earnings management, either due to market pressures or pursuit of short-term profits. As a result, this research focuses on the impact of dual-class structure on earnings management. This study employs quantitative methods and conducts panel data regression analysis. The empirical findings reveal that companies with a dual-class structure exhibit a higher propensity for engaging in both accrual-based earnings management and real earnings management. Consequently, this paper contributes empirical evidence concerning the economic consequences of adopting the dual-class structure within emerging markets. In future research, it may be beneficial to contextualize the specific factors influencing the implementation of dual-class structures within a particular emerging market and explore whether there is a tendency for companies to eventually converge towards a unified structure.
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