2009 was the default year of Malaysian sukuk. It grew larger due to blind market information about defaults, summing up the loss of USD 2.243 billion. Malaysian sukuk market still survived mainly due to petro-dollars and no competition pressure. By 2010, IMF and World Bank were unanimous to say that Malaysia had won the rightly envisioned status of global investment hub. More than 25% of sukuk assets, placed with her and 84% of short term sukuk are in MYR, certainly contributive to her GDP. By 2015 the sukuk market has entered into consolidation phase, with lesser issuances, stark down petroleum prices, sluggish post-crisis economy, down rated MYR, inflation and much higher competitive pressure. Saudi Arabia got IMF support for sukuk and Bahrain doubled its market share in a single year. This time the market forces would not relax Malaysia. Getting lesson from 2009, before the contagion ignites it is the time to check our safety measures against the default. Basing upon the logics drawn from extensive past literature this concept paper sorts the Corporate Governance (CG) and Sustainability (CS) for defensive mechanism against the defaults. Their inter-relation and relation with default risk have been discussed to reach over a conceptualized framework. It was observed that the CG-risk models are alone insufficient to make a plausible conclusion. CS has straightforward defensive role against defaults. But CG is clear to control CS. To say that CG-risk relation is better performed via CS performance. The discussion has been concluded in the managerial implications and directions for future research in the related fields.
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In-Text Citation: (Rehman et al., 2020)
To Cite this Article: Rehman, A. U., Zaidel, M. A. bin, Jais, M. bin, & Malik, A. H. (2020). Sukuk Default: Could Corporate Governance & Sustainability be the Defenders? International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 10(5), 533–545.
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