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In-Text Citation: (Mappadang, 2019)
To Cite this Article: Mappadang, A. (2019). Do Corporate Governance Mechanism Influences Tax Avoidance and Firm Value? International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 9(10), 203–217.
Copyright: © 2019 The Author(s)
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