In this paper, we investigate the empirical relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetry across a range of French firms.
Based on a cross-sectional analysis, our study of the empirical relationship between corporate governance and information asymmetry involved 160 companies over the years 2008-2010. Mechanisms of corporate governance include the characteristics of the board of directors.
Our results seem to indicate a significant relationship between certain mechanisms of corporate governance and the information asymmetry of the French market. These mechanisms can reduce adverse selection costs, and make exchanges more transparent.
These results suggest that firms with efficient corporate governance mechanisms may reduce informative asymmetry and improve transparency between investors.
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