International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences

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Discrimination of Corporate Governance Principles by Agents in Turkish SMEs

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The main purpose of this study is to investigate whether managers and owners of SMEs have different levels of interest towards corporate governance principles. Specifically, we aim to reveal which corporate principles discriminate owners from managers in SMEs. In order to investigate this, we collected data from owners and managers of 147 firms. Our analyses results revealed that one variable in discriminating between owners and managers was the most significant, which was namely accountability.
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