The study was conducted to find out the family control on firm cash holding. The study was conducted in the non financial sector of Pakistan. 100 non financial firms were selected for the data collection. The data was collected from the annual reports of the list firms from 2008 to 2013. Family ownership, board size, net working capital and firm size are the independent and cash holding as dependent variable of the study. Panel data regression was used in the current study for the data analysis. As per the results of fixed effect model as recommended by the hausman test; 1) Family ownership has positive and significant effects on firm cash holdings; 2) Board size has positive and insignificant effects on firm cash holdings; 3) Net working capital has negative and insignificant effects on firm cash holdings and 4) Firm size has negative and significant effects on firm cash holdings.
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Khalil, S., & Ali, L. (2015). The Effect of Family Ownership on Cash Holdings of the Firm (Karachi Stock Exchange). International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 5(6). 120-126.
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