

## Post-election Violent among Youth in Kaduna State, Nigeria: A Passion to Godfathers Politics

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### Abstract

Godfather politics is one of the greatest problems Nigeria's political system is facing, Kaduna State has a history of violent local conflicts over which group should govern the state and the country. This study is especially important for addressing problems that obstruct society's development because more than 800 of the 1000 fatalities happened in Kaduna. The main objective of this paper is to investigate the problems of post-election violence in relation to the of role Godfather politics in Nigeria. The paper examine the nature, and effect of godfathers in Nigeria's political arena, and also the reasons for post-election violence in Kaduna State. The study adopts Elite's theory of democracy which gives a clear explanation about who godfathers politics organized post-election violent protests among youth in Nigeria. The questionnaires were made and distributed using Google Forms to 300 respondents. Using random sampling. The finding shows that majority the of respondents agreed that hate speech by the opposition party was the reason that led to post-election violence, It is therefore recommended that the national assembly should enact laws that strictly prohibit the production importing, exporting, and acquisition of weapons by individuals in Nigeria, particularly politicians.

**Keywords:** Post-Election, Violent Protest, Youth, Passion, Godfathers Politics

### Introduction

Political elites orchestrated a violent post-election protest in an effort to seize control of all political spheres. Pre and post-election violence that can cause chaos and instability in the polity make up political violence, which poses a significant threat to stability in Nigeria generally. This specific issue has repeatedly arisen, particularly in Kaduna State. It may take the form of election campaigns and other forms of violence associated with electioneering, and its effects on the country's development cannot be ignored (Peter & AbdulRahman, 2018). Some Nigerian godfathers' recent actions could be compared to mafia-like

characteristics, some people still believe that the presence of godfathers serves as a check on power in democracies because they can distribute power as they see fit and anoint the rulers. But in the strange political climate of Nigeria, the godfather has taken on a new meaning. It has developed into a threat that undermines the foundations of populist governance, depriving Nigerians of the much-deserving benefits of democracy. Therefore, it is against this backdrop that research is needed in order to reduce such phenomenon in Nigeria's political arena.

Furthermore, in Kaduna State which has a long history of godfather politics in Northern Nigeria. Since 1953, during the period of self-government up to the fourth republic, when uninterrupted democracy was experienced from 1999 to 2023, godfathers have played a significant role in Nigerian politics. As previously mentioned, having political connections at the highest levels of government increases a godfather's power and influence. However, in Nigeria's political climate, godfathers have taken on an odd dimension. It has developed into a threat that undermines the foundations of populist governance, depriving Nigerians of the much-deserved benefits of democracy (Muhammad, 202). In addition, when Malam Nasir al-Rufai was elected as governor of Kaduna State in 2015, he made efforts to weaken the godfather politics there. El-Rufai claimed that he was able to resign because some political godfathers who controlled Kaduna State's affairs had done so in the most recent general elections. El-Rufai stressed that "many of the godfathers are just on paper or in the minds of people in politics. There were three or four politicians in Kaduna that you could not become anything without having them on your side" (Sanni, 2019). "Those were the political godfathers of Kaduna, and you had to carry them along. You know, to 'carry them along', is to pay them regularly" (Sanni, 2019). "But we took a different route, and the end result is that after the 2019 election, we had no choice but to retire each one", he continued (Sanni, 2019). This declaration by the Kaduna State governor in office demonstrates the efforts made to lessen the influence of godfather politics there (Sanni, 2019).

### **Conceptual Clarifications**

#### *Post-election*

Refers to the time period following an election, as well as to any plans, activities, or schedule after that time.

#### *Violent Protest*

When a large group of people are violently protesting in the streets or another public area, there is considered to be violent protest. Either two or more groups are engaged in combat, or one group is wreaking havoc.

#### *Youth*

Youths, who are typically defined as people between the ages of 18 and 39, are those who are in the transitional stage between childhood and adulthood (Gadau & Malami, 2022).

#### *Godfathers Politics*

In politics, "godfathers" are men with the authority to personally choose both the candidates who will run for office and the outcome of those elections. Godfather serves as a kingmaker, boss, mentor, and instructors. A godfather is someone who has amassed unfathomable respect and supporters (voters) in the community, as well as an effectively run the political

platform and broad public support that could ensure the victory of his preferred candidates (Igbini & Okolie, 2020).

### *Passion in Politics*

Religious belief and phenomena related to collective identification both cause people to act in ways that are not consistent with any rational account of their interests and do not follow from any rationally comprehensible set of principles. In today's imaginary patriotism debates, there is a secret issue of passion that is at the core or behind the discussion (Walzer, 2002)

### **Objectives**

- i. To examine the effects of God father politics in Nigeria
- ii. To determine the Nature of godfathers Politics that resulted into political instability in Kaduna State and Nigeria.
- iii. To identify solutions and Recommendations towards enhancing good Governance in Kaduna state

### **Literature Review**

Examining the past, it is clear from the literature that Godfatherism is not an emerging trend in Nigerian politics. (Ishaku and Jatau, 2014). However, according to Ajayi (2005), a "godfather" is a king-maker, boss, guide, and principal, while a godson is the beneficiary and heir to a godfather's legacy. A godfather is a person who has amassed unfathomable respect and supporters in the community, as well as having a well-organized political platform, and widespread support from all parties. Furthermore Ayoade (2007), argue that the term "godfatherism" is used to refer to the bond between a godfather and godson in its most basic form. Godfathers differ slightly from the mafia and political backers. The Kaduna Mafia is one of the formidable, influential blocs that make up mafianism in 21st-century politics. In addition, A situation known as "political godfatherism" occurs when extremely wealthy and influential members of the elite class use their resources to decide who should be elected to positions of authority. Whom the people elect to rule or hold a particular political office. Usually, intimidation, retaliation, and an excessive expenditure of money are used to compel the masses to follow the leaders. The financial support system for politicians who are determined to win elected office at all costs is provided by political godfathers. These people frequently end up being bound to their godfathers by an apron string (Oтите and Umukoro, 2010). For, Bassey and Enetak (2008) Godfatherism is a term that refers to the influence and power of politically significant individuals in selecting candidates for office and the eventual winner of those elections. Godfathers have a lot of political clout and can sway public opinion in favors of the political party and/or candidate they support. Godfathers are those who practice godfatherism, and godsons are those who gain from their good deeds.

According to Kolawole (2004) the scholars mentioned above discussed the limitations of godfatherism and, of course, how it is used in Nigeria today. In other words, it could be argued that these authors base their arguments for their points of view on the reality of Nigeria. Looking back at the past, it is clear that the idea is not a bad one; it is as a political king making institution through which some political officeholders with shaky political influence come into power. The phenomenon can be broadly understood as a practice that involves the maintenance of a certain type of social and political relationships between the superior and the inferior for the propagation and fulfillment of specific duties desires, and interactions that

bind both together or in which both have an equal stake but where the superior decides what the inferior receives as a result (Williams, 2004).

For Nnamani (2004), he emphasized that the socio-economic situation of Nigerians has gotten worse due to the political godfather's role in Nigerian politics; the phenomenon has increased unemployment in Nigeria, encouraged political corruption, and widened the wealth and poverty gap. In addition, claims that the role of godfather in any system is similar to a virus that frequently spreads hate but especially seeks to subjugate the godson he planted and would want to do his will at all costs. Through his godfather, the godson is elevated to a position of subordination. He claims that "the godfather is a merchant out to win the godson as a customer." The godfather is merely a self-centered person looking to use the government for his own gain. A study by Edigin (2010:175) indicates or views the godfather as a human who plays the role of god to his people in a related development. He meets their fundamental needs for them, keeps them safe, and helps them secure and accomplish their goals. He goes on to say that his backing could be viewed as an investment that, in his opinion, must soon start to pay off. As a result, the need for a sustainable democracy in Nigeria is to improve both the political and socioeconomic situation of the nation through widespread public participation in the formulation of public policies and decisions. This is in contrast to the Nigerian political system, in which those who attained political power in both the legislative and executive branches of government were elected to office with the help and support of some political godfathers in numerous states. However, political godfathers aspire to hold positions of authority and influence in society (Alabi & Tunde, 2013:2-3). In another Development, The word "Godfather" is used to refer to political Godfatherism or patronage in some nations, including Canada. Political patronage refers to the giving of favors or incentives to a client by a patron (who controls their giving), such as public office, jobs, contracts, assistance, prestige, or other valuable benefits (The Canadian Encyclopedia, 2013).

### **The Nature of Godfather's Politics in Nigeria's Political Arena**

The practice of the politics of godfathers is not new in Nigerian political circles, but it has become more prevalent since the country's return to democracy, undermining the legitimacy of the government and invalidating citizens' right to vote and choose the candidate of their choice (Ahmed, 2019). Political godfathers use their power to prevent others from getting involved in Nigerian politics; they act as political gatekeepers, controlling who can and cannot participate in politics. As the incumbent godson struggles to satisfy the whims and caprices of the godfather while also meeting other competing demands on the limited resources of the government, the interests of the greater number are viciously undercut. This type of situation encourages mediocrity and financial corruption (Okonkwo, 2016).

However, godfather politics in Nigeria has been one of contributing factor that changed the Nigerian political atmosphere as the godfathers enter into agreements that will allow them to exert control over various aspects of government and sponsor their godsons for political office. After winning elections and establishing government, the godsons frequently find the godfathers to be intrusive and violate the agreement to assert their control as the offices demand. The godfathers will act against their godsons, and there will be conflict, some of which will turn violent (Ita, 2022). Since 1999, this scenario has occurred in most state governor races, such as Wike vs. Odeli in Rivers State, and Chris Uba vs. Chris Ngige in Anambra State. Wammako vs. Ahmed Aliyu (Sokoto State), Dan Juma Goje vs. Inuwa Yahaya (Gombe State) (Ita, 2022).

### **Effect of Godfather's Politics in Nigeria**

#### **No Right to Select Candidates**

In Nigerian politics, a godfather has the authority to choose a candidate, not the people who will be ruled by that candidate. This is due to the circumstances under which godfathers decide who will run for office or impose their preferred candidates on the members of society. This would be the smallest and most direct attack on democratic ideals (Igbini & Okolie, 2020). This scenario has changed the Nigerian political system which leads to post-election violence. It Influences Electoral Violence

To achieve his social, political, and economic influence, the godfathers guarantee their godsons' electoral success. In order to promote the interests of the aristocrat rather than the electorates, elections have turned into a tool, particularly in Nigeria's fourth republic. The philosophical underpinnings and fundamental tenets of democracy are being ignored, which causes Nigerian voters to lose faith in the election and the government. This has become apparent in the majority of electorates because godfather planned the majority of the post-election violence for his own personal gain in order to exert control over Nigeria's political structures (Ohiole & Ojo, 2016).

#### *Exclusion of Credible People from Politics*

The wrong people take over when the right candidate is rejected during elections. Such people are not suitable for leadership positions. Typically, this leads to poor management and a lack of responsibility. This could be used to explain the situation in some states in northwestern Nigeria where many House of Representatives were chosen by godfathers who had no power to influence decisions made in the Nigerian parliament (Ogundiya, 2010).

#### *The Contest for Supremacy*

Godfathers and their godsons compete for supremacy, which causes conflict that results in the destruction of both private and public property. Most often, innocent people's lives are taken. The conflict brought on by godfathers has reportedly become one of the biggest issues the Nigerian political system is currently dealing with (Edigin, 2010). Because the person who pays the drummer also controls the music, the holder of the political position turns into his godfather's stooge. Every time the godson declines to comply with the godfather's request, he is ultimately removed from office. Examples of this in the current political climate include the Adedibu-Ladoja crisis and the confrontation between Kwankwaso and Ganduje, among others (Ojo, 2006).

### **Reasons for Post-Election Violence in Nigeria**

#### **Fear of Losing Power**

Elections put leaders in a difficult situation because they can bring about a number of benefits, like legitimising a leader's position of authority, but they can also bring about uncertainty regarding their outcome. An incumbent may resort to various forms of political repression, including violence, in response to the fear of losing power as a result of an election (such as losing the vote, encountering post-election protest, or other unfavorable outcomes). Election violence is caused by these threats against the incumbent (Hafner-Burton et al., 2012).

### *Fake Results Announcement*

This happens following the announcement of election results, when the parties who were not favored by the outcome attack the rivals. There is no need for violence to occur when a popular candidate wins an election because everyone in the constituency will be happy that they were successful in electing the candidate they desired. But there is that propensity for widespread violence to occur when an unpopular candidate is announced, against the wishes of the majority (Ita, 2022). For instance, similar to this, after the People's Democratic Party (PDP) candidate Goodluck Jonathan was declared the winner of the April 2011 presidential election, post-election violence broke out, especially in some parts of Northern Nigeria, including Bauchi, Yobe, Maiduguri, and Kaduna, among other places (Abimbola & Adesote, 2012). So also in 2023 general election in Adamawa when the incumbent were announced the loses, after the coalition of results was not completed, because 10 out of 20 local government were announce, violence break and electoral office were attack which resulted with high number of casualties.

### *Hate Speech by Opposition Party*

In Nigeria, this is growing to be a significant issue. Especially in the lead-up to general elections, people have the ability to make statements or accusations that are not backed up by facts or verifiable evidence, and these statements or accusations can quickly spread online to incite conflict and hate. Hate speech refers to any harshly expressed opinions, whether expressed orally or in writing, that have the potential to stir up conflict or prejudice (Mbah et al., 2019). However, defines hate speech as any statement that has the potential to damage a person's reputation, mental health, or worldview (Peter & Adeniyi, 2017). For example, other Northern politicians, including former civil rights activist Shehu Sani and General Muhammadu Buhari, who ran as the first runner-up in the 2003, 2007 and 2011 presidential elections, delivered passionate speeches against President Jonathan's desire and candidature (Ikeanyibe et al., 2018; Mbah et al., 2017). So also, in resent general elections in 2023 Dino Maleye spoke person of People Democratic Party (PDP) Presidential campaign council made a harshly hate speech to APC Vice presidential candidate Alhaji Kashim Shatima during campaign rally in Yobe State which generate comments from people all over the country that threatened the society.

### *Illegal Acquisition of Arms*

There is no denying that the majority of Nigerian leaders prefer to use arms and weapons over submitting mandates from their people in order to gain political power. The Nigerian political system is fragile and weak, and the production of small arms and light weapons poses a serious economic, social, and political challenge. Therefore, unrestricted access to them and their distortion put a nation's safety, security, and progress at risk. Violence between ethno-religious groups is caused by the accumulation and use of fire for illegal purposes (Yoroms, 2015). The author added that, youth had access to firearms during elections, which increased the risk of post-election violence after the results were announced and further polarized communal groups and the destruction of respect for human rights and dignity. These factors make democratic development difficult.

### *Religion and Zoning' Agreement by Political Parties*

Before the election, the ruling party controversially abandoned this. Local grievances in Kaduna State intersected with the polarizing lines of the election's intensified polarization,

which resulted in an escalation of violence that had initially started in connection with street protests following the announcement of the results. The electoral division fueled into mobilization structures in Kaduna State that reflected the outward manifestation of the national division that the presidential candidates had come to represent—a Christian south and a Muslim north—and which followed divisions from previous clashes in the state, pitting Hausa-Fulani Muslims against Christian ethnic groups. Due to overlapping local and national grievances, a sense of vulnerability among Muslim and Christian groups, as well as the protests' spread, contributed to the violence's rapid escalation (Angerbrandt, 2018).

### **God Father Politics and post-election Violence in Kaduna**

In Nigerian politics, the "godfather phenomenon" has taken a frightening turn. As many academics in the field of politics have correctly pointed out (Omotola, 2007) In Kaduna the study area God father Politics has led to post election violence in the presidential and gubernatorial elections that took place in 2019, caused ethnic and religious divisions in Kaduna. As election results trickled in on April 17, it became clear that the current governor of the state had won, and the godfather of the opposition party had lost. The opposition party mobilizes youth in the streets to protest what they believed to be election rigging, where they met with supporters of the winning party. Tyres were set ablaze by the protesters, and riots soon followed. The rioting across the Kaduna states quickly turned into sectarian and ethnic bloodletting. Muslim rioters killed and burned the churches, stores, and homes of Christians and people from southern ethnic groups in Nigeria who were thought to have supported the ruling party. Police stations, the offices of the ruling party, and the electoral commission were also attacked by the rioters. Mobs of Christians in Kaduna State's predominantly Christian communities retaliated by killing Muslims and setting their mosques and properties on fire. In the post-election riots, at least 170 Christians were killed, hundreds more were hurt, and thousands were displaced, (Agbalajobi, 2019) according to the Christian Association of Nigeria, the umbrella group that represents the majority of Christian churches in Nigeria. Additionally, according to the organization, Muslim rioters in 10 northern states burned or destroyed more than 350 churches. According to Muslim and Christian leaders contacted by Human Rights Watch, more than 500 people have died as a result of sectarian clashes in southern Kaduna State's predominantly Christian towns and villages, including Zonkwa, Matsirga, and Kafanchan. In these areas, Muslims made up the lion's share of the victims. (Shekwolo & James, 2021).

### **Theoretical Framework**

#### **Elite Theory**

In order to explain the subject at hand, the study employed Elite theory. by Vilfredo Pareto put forth this theory in 1935; it is based on the idea that the elites alternate in their control of the country's affairs, which inevitably results in a few elites ruling over the majority of the electorate at the expense of the latter. It is believed that Pareto and Mosca first proposed the law of elite rotation in 1935. In accordance with the aforementioned supposition and to bolster the argument, elite theory regards elites as players who control the state and national resources and hold significant positions within power networks (Yamokoski and Dubrow, 2008). One of the primary assumptions of elite theory is that every society has a minority that rules over the rest of society. This minority makes up the political class or ruling elite, which is typically made up of people who hold positions of political authority or who regularly have direct access to decision-making in politics. (Suenu, 2004, Nkwede, 2014)

As a result, the perception of elites is more closely linked to Weberian knowledge of power, which is defined as the capability of carrying out one's will even when it is contrary to the will of the majority of people (Weber, 1922:696). However, it is acknowledged that power can be exercised using real or imagined resources. Consequently, the term "elites" can be used to refer to anyone who controls a capital (Reis, 2005). This theory focused on the distribution of power among society's elites. Furthermore, the theory contends that the only way power can be distributed is at the expense of the general populace. The relevance of this theory to the current study cannot be overemphasized. This is due to its interconnectedness to the explanation of political Godfather politics in a democratic regime, which political command and has direct influence on political decisions in Nigeria and in Kaduna State, which has its implications on the economic, political, and social development in Nigeria.

### Methodology

This paper uses quantitative research because it is more accurate, and precisely measured. The questionnaires were distributed using Google Forms involved 300 respondents. The local governments were those of Kaduna North and Kaduna South. The general public provided 150 respondents, while 50 were civil servant and 100 students of tertiary institution' in the state. The questionnaires are delivered via email link. The respondents were chosen at random from the sample.

### Results and Discussions

#### The Socio-Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents

This section deals with the socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents, specifically sex of respondents, age, marital status, educational background, employment status and income.

Table 1

*Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents (n = 300)*

| Variables                     | Percentage                 |      |
|-------------------------------|----------------------------|------|
| <b>Sex</b>                    | Male                       | 54.3 |
|                               | Female                     | 45.6 |
| <b>Age</b>                    | 18-23 Years                | 17.6 |
|                               | 24-28 Years                | 10.6 |
|                               | 29-34 Years                | 41.6 |
|                               | 35-40 Years                | 24.3 |
|                               | No response                | 5.6  |
| <b>Marital State</b>          | Single                     | 28.6 |
|                               | Married                    | 71.3 |
| <b>Educational Background</b> | Primary Certificate        | 9.3  |
|                               | Secondary Certificate      | 27.6 |
|                               | Post-Secondary Certificate | 57.6 |
|                               | No response                | 15.3 |
| <b>Employment Status</b>      | Self-employed              | 14.6 |
|                               | Employed by public sector  | 21.3 |
|                               | Employed by private sector | 10.3 |
|                               | Student                    | 43.6 |
|                               | Not working                | 9.3  |



|                      | No response           | 0.6  |
|----------------------|-----------------------|------|
| <b>Annual Income</b> | below ₦30, 000        | 9.3  |
|                      | ₦30, 000 – ₦60, 000   | 17.3 |
|                      | ₦60, 000 – ₦90, 000   | 16.6 |
|                      | ₦90, 000 – ₦120, 000  | 47.6 |
|                      | ₦120, 000 – ₦150, 000 | 7.3  |
|                      | No response           | 1.6  |

The finding shows that 54.3% of the respondents were male. The respondents who were between the ages of 29 and 34 years have the highest percentage with 41.6%, followed by the respondents who were between 35 and 40 years with 24.3%. Moreover, more than half of the respondents were married, while 28.6% were single. Again, 27.6% of the respondents had secondary school education, while 57.6% had post-secondary education. Therefore, more than half of the respondents had at least post-secondary school education. Furthermore, 41.6% and 21.3% were self-employed and employed in the public sector respectively. In terms of income, 7.3% earned more than ₦120,000 annually, 9.3% below ₦30,000 and 17.3% between ₦30,000 and ₦60,000. Therefore, more than half of the respondents were low-income earners.

#### **Nature and Effect of Godfather's Politics in Nigeria**

This section presents the Nature and effect of godfather Politics in Nigeria. Thus, Table 2 shows data on the effects of godfather politics in Nigeria particularly in Kaduna State.

Table 2

#### *Effect of godfather's politics in Nigeria*

| <b>Nature and Effect</b>                   | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>Percent</b> |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| No right to select candidates              | 82               | 27.3           |
| It influences electoral violence           | 68               | 22.6           |
| Exclusion of credible people from politics | 134              | 44.6           |
| The contest for supremacy                  | 16               | 5.3            |
| <b>Total</b>                               | <b>300</b>       | <b>100.00</b>  |

The data show that 27.3% of the respondents accepted that no right to select candidates as one of the effects of godfather politics in Nigeria, the political parties may not decide on a particular candidate as provided by the constitution, but God fathers decision which is final while 22.6% of the respondents testified that one of the effects of Godfather politics is it influenced electoral violence. are such if other candidate whom were not selected by the God father, may organized a violence protest before or during election in other not to have free and fair elections .Moreover, 44.6% of the respondents agree that one of the effects of godfather politics in Nigeria is it led to exclusion of credible people from politics, whom if given a chance will improve the democratic process which will lead to peace in the process, while 5.3% which is the lowest percentage agreed that godfather politics in Nigeria led to contest for supremacy, were by many politicians will be looking for a political position to contest with do or die affairs which may lead to so many utterance in to the system.

**Reasons for Post-Election Violence in Nigeria**

Table 3

*Reasons for post-election violence in Nigeria*

| <b>Reasons for post-election violence in Nigeria</b> | <b>Frequency</b> | <b>Percent</b> |
|--|------------------|----------------|
| Fear of Losing Power                                 | 55               | 18.3           |
| Fake results announcement                            | 62               | 20.6           |
| Hate speech by opposition party                      | 91               | 30.3           |
| Illegal acquisition of arms                          | 73               | 24.3           |
| Religion and zoning' agreement by political party    | 19               | 6.3            |
| <b>Total</b>   | <b>300</b>       | <b>100.00</b>  |

This section presents data on the reasons for post-election Violence in Nigeria. Thus, according to Table 3, 18.3% of the respondent agreed that fear of losing power as reason for post-election violence as mention in the research, because in Nigeria when a politician loses power, he lose everything including his supports, his wealth, his image and his integrity that is the mean reason why politicians fellow so many strategies to win an election ,while 20.6% of the respondent agreed that fake results announcement as another reason that led to post election violence in Nigeria, were by some biased staff of electoral body may change results of the elections during the coalitions of results which will lead to post election violence, however, 30.3% of the respondents accepted that hate speech by opposition party as another reason that assist in bowling post-election in Nigeria, as a results of political utterances or historical statements that will caused misunderstanding between communities ,a politician may use such statements in order to achieved their political desires by creating violence in the society ,while, 24.3% of the respondents agreed that illegal acquisition of arms as another reasons, because using arms as a protection from the political opponent, such scenario has changed the Nigerian political system even after the election because people has access to weapons more especially youths whose commit crimes even after the election period, so also 6.3% of the respondents which is the lowest agreed that religion and zoning agreement by political parties as another reason for post-election violence in Nigeria, that is ethnicity and tribalism which has change entirely the Nigerian political landscape, which assess in producing leaders of no focus and no direction.

**Conclusions**

While the roles of voters were rapidly dwindling, the godfathers were able to seize control of Nigeria's political institutions. Relationships between patrons and clients undermine political institutions, slow down economic growth, and obstruct political advancement. in addition, Godfathers has led to the intentional removal of reliable individuals from the decision-making process as a result. Many candidates for political office are frequently deprived of their impartial and logical sense of judgment. When the proper candidate is not elected during elections, the wrong people take over. Such people are not suitable for positions of leadership. Maladministration and a lack of accountability are typically the outcomes of this. Therefore, godfathers is a threat to Nigerian democracy and a disease that weakens the country's entire democratic system, both of which require special attention if Nigeria is to achieve its goal of becoming one of the best nations in the world for good governance and development

### Recommendations

1. To improve the quality of the options, there must be a mandatory presidential debate.
2. Before the swearing-in, every electoral petition issue should be completed.
3. The national assembly should enact laws that strictly prohibit the production, importing, exporting, and acquisition of weapons by individuals in Nigeria, particularly politicians.
4. To address the issues of post-election violence, Interpol's resources should be improved, and their mandate should be expanded to include the prohibition of arms and weapons smuggling across national borders.
5. The government should forge alliances with other nations, particularly those in Africa where post-election violence has escalated, in order to support and strengthen the capability of monitoring, control, arms accumulations, and circulation.
6. The principles of direct primaries should be adopted by all political parties at all levels, as this would allow any interested citizen to run for office and engage in politics.
7. Drug abuse should be addressed by all levels of government because it is one of the enemies of youth and prevents them from getting involved in the political process.
8. In order to solve the problems of post-election violence and God father politics, government should implement the studies and recommendations made by the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS).
9. Political parties in Nigeria should be founded base on principles and ideologies rather than on geographic, ethnic, or religious lines.
10. Civil society should be encouraged by government to conduct research on how to overcome the issues of post-election violence and God father politics in Nigeria.

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