



INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PUBLIC POLICY & GOVERNANCE

ACADEMIC RESEARCH IN



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To Link this Article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.6007/IJARPPG/v9-i1/7443>

DOI:10.6007/IJARPPG/v9-i1/7443

Received: 08 July 2023, **Revised:** 11 August 2023, **Accepted:** 28 August 2023

Published Online: 15 September 2023

In-Text Citation: (Song et al., 2023)

To Cite this Article: Song, L., Kitili, I. M., & Ren, Y. (2023). Navigating Governance: A Comparative Analysis of Statutory Bodies in Singapore and Australia. *International Journal of Academic Research in Public Policy and Governance*, 9(1), 84–107.

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Vol. 9, No. 1, 2023, Pg. 84 - 107

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Navigating Governance: A Comparative Analysis of Statutory Bodies in Singapore and Australia

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Abstract

This study explores the intricacies of statutory bodies in two distinct and dynamic countries, namely Singapore and Australia. An extensive examination uncovers the resemblances and disparities in the governance frameworks of these institutions, highlighting the pivotal function that these organisations fulfil in shaping public policy and upholding accountability. While Singapore adopts a centralised and hierarchical approach, in contrast to Australia's decentralised one, it is noteworthy that both countries have a strong commitment to upholding transparency and safeguarding the public interest. This comparative study offers valuable insights into the evolving landscape of statutory bodies and serves as a guiding tool for investigating governance in a rapidly changing society.

Keywords: Statutory Bodies, Singapore, Australia, Governance, Comparative Analysis

Introduction

Since the 1980s, several governments have outsourced implementing the policy by establishing or reforming 'agencies' (Christopher Pollitt et al., 2005). Government agencies play a huge role in citizens' daily lives. Most administrative tasks in countries like the USA, UK, and Singapore are delegated to independent agencies. For instance, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission encourages fair business and oversees product safety, whereas the Homes and Development Board in Singapore provides homes. The term "agencification" is commonly used to characterize this transformation.

Establishing the Housing and Development Board of Singapore as a statutory entity, consumer groups, and procedures are all examples of the agencification process (Verhoest, 2017). Experts in agencies have identified five distinct types of agencies, numbered from zero to four. Verhoest et al (n.d.) state that type 0 agencies is national central or federal government divisions or branches. This research will focus on Type 2 agencies and legally autonomous organizations like statutory bodies. Type 3 agencies are private or private law-based organizations; Type 4 agencies are bodies created through decentralization, delegation, or devolution; and Type 1 agencies are semi-autonomous organizations.

This study will focus on type 2 agency-statutory bodies. There are different definitions of statutory bodies. For instance, Lee Boon Hiok defined statutory bodies as entities that were created by a parliamentary act (Lee, 1975). Statutory bodies were described by Tan Chwee

Huat as independent government organizations created by special law to carry out particular tasks (Tan, 1974). Statutory bodies are legal entities that are apart from the government structure and the civil service system and are a part of the semi-government body (Jing & Zhong, 2011). Statutory bodies are non-sectoral, semi-independent public entities that the government creates to carry out exceptional public management or public service tasks, according to (Fu, 2009) definition. Managing a statutory body's legal status, employment status, and financial arrangements must all be adequately handled. A statutory body does not have the same legal rights and protections as government agencies because it is not a civil service component. Since statutory boards, as opposed to government agencies, are in charge of their own legal proceedings, contracts, and agreements, as well as the purchase and sale of property, they have more freedom and flexibility in carrying out their obligations.

In most cases, the administration of statutory bodies can be broken down into three distinct groups. An organization's Board of Directors comprises prominent members of the government, prominent businesspeople, prominent professionals, and representatives from labor unions. In most cases, the Minister in charge of the statutory body will select for the Chairman of the Board of Directors either a House of Representatives member, a senior civil service official, or an eminent figure in the relevant field. The management team comprises general managers or executive directors, board members, secretaries, and department heads. This team reports directly to the board of directors. When it comes to decision-making, the management team and board of directors are assisted in the process by administrators, executives, and clerical personnel. Because they are not a public service component, statutory entities are not included in the definition of what constitutes a civil servant.

A statutory body is an entity authorized to implement legislation and can also make decisions on its own accord. The qualities of statutory entities that were described above define statutory bodies. This can be achieved in some circumstances by endowing them with authority to draught regulations or statutory instruments in their respective domains or by delegating this responsibility to them. "statutory authorities" refers to another name for "statutory bodies." The vast majority of them can be found in nations that have modeled their parliamentary democracies after the British system, such as the United Kingdom, and in nations that are a part of the Commonwealth, such as Australia, Canada, Ireland, and New Zealand. Parliamentary democracies are types of governments rooted in the United Kingdom. They are not just in Israel, but also in Malaysia, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Statutory bodies have an understandable organizational structure. The company is divided into various departments, each of which is in charge of a specific task.

Statutory bodies, often known as government-owned firms, are held up as a model of organizational survival by most administrative organizations. Historically, their significance as government organizations has frequently come before establishing ministries and departments. They have been utilized more frequently as service providers and regulators than non-ministerial executive bodies and more frequently in the management of public enterprises than government firms since at least very recently. They have proved they can adjust to new requirements, interests, and circumstances.

The Purpose and Scope of the Paper

The purpose of this paper is to conduct an analysis of statutory bodies in Singapore and Australia. The paper aims to provide an overview of the roles and functions of statutory bodies in these countries, and also aims to evaluate the effectiveness of these bodies in

promoting economic growth, social welfare, and environmental sustainability in their respective countries.

The scope of this paper will cover the following aspects of statutory bodies in Singapore and Australia: Analysis of the governance structure of statutory bodies, including the roles and responsibilities of their boards and senior management.

Review of the performance of statutory bodies in achieving their objectives, as measured by key performance indicators and other metrics. The paper will draw on a range of primary and secondary sources, including academic literature, government reports, and other relevant materials. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a historical context of statutory bodies and distinctive features of statutory bodies, and section 3 statutory bodies in Singapore, Section 4 Statutory bodies in Australia, Section 5 is the similarities and challenges of statutory bodies in both countries and Section 6 concludes and discusses possible next steps for research.

Historical Context of Statutory Bodies and Distinctive Features of Statutory Bodies

Creating statutory bodies in public administration dates back to the latter half of the 19th century and the early 20th century when many nations developed modern governance systems and needed specialized agencies to accomplish specific tasks. During this period, many nations needed specialized agencies to accomplish particular tasks.

The United States Civil Service Commission (*United States Civil Service Commission - Ballotpedia*, n.d.) is one of the earliest examples of a statutory body in public administration, founded in 1871 to regulate federal government employment and management. One of the oldest examples of its kind is this commission. Its primary duty was to ensure compliance with civil service rules and regulations. Similar institutions were founded in other countries. The event before this one was the primary driving force for both organisations to be established.

Through the middle of the 20th century, governments continued to form statutory bodies to address new social, economic, and political challenges. In response to the growing complexity of these issues, this was done. In order to meet the demands of the changing times, we did this. In the United States, the Environmental Protection Agency was established in 1970 to address environmental concerns (*U.S. Environmental Protection Agency | US EPA*, n.d.), and the Health and Safety Executive in the United Kingdom was established in 1974 to ensure workers' safety (*HSE: Information about Health and Safety at Work*, n.d.). Both organizations aim to protect the environment and workers' health and safety. Both organizations were founded as part of their nations' efforts to ensure workers' health and safety. Each group is working towards the same goal: finding solutions to analogous situations.

In today's modern society, statutory bodies play a crucial role in public administration. As part of this objective, they provide specialized expertise and implement legislation in various areas, such as labor and health law, environmental protection, consumer protection, and environmental protection. Furthermore, they protect the environment. In addition to enforcing laws and regulations, they often conduct investigations, establish punishments, and undertake any other enforcement actions that may be necessary. As part of their authority, they can enforce laws and regulations.

Recent years have seen a growing awareness of the importance of these groups in promoting openness, accountability, and good governance in public administration. Due to this growing realization, many governments have implemented changes intended to strengthen the autonomy and efficiency of their statutory bodies. As a result of these reforms,

their statutory bodies are expected to become more efficient. Statutory bodies were founded on influential ideas.

Many explanations and hypotheses, such as the principal-agent theory, have been put out to explain the formation of statutory bodies and the duties these entities perform. Goal conflict and information asymmetry are prevalent in the public sector, and the principal-agent theory focuses on how the principal can govern the agent in these circumstances (Halachmi & Boorsma, 1998). The core control mechanisms in the NPM reforms, such as identification, are created to solve the difficulties in giving government agencies more autonomy. The principal-agent theory is utilized as a theoretical rationale for the NPM reforms. According to the principal-agent theory, because bureaucracies are highly specialized, agents have some discretion when carrying out tasks on behalf of principals. As a result, there is an information imbalance because the agent needs to gain more excellent knowledge about the procedures, outcomes, and other crucial aspects of the implementation process.

Additionally, as agents are presumed to be utility-maximizing actors, their interests might sometimes line up with those of the principal, and they may exercise their discretion to pursue their objectives at the expense of the main. The agent's opportunistic behavior may lead to moral hazard and adverse selection. Goal conflict and knowledge asymmetry can both have negative impacts, so there are numerous control mechanisms the principal might employ to lessen their impact. The principal may assess the agent's performance through monitoring tools or monetary rewards. The principal-agent theory states that significant and suitable incentives are necessary to realize the performance gains of expanded autonomy (Verhoest et al., 2004).

According to the public interest theory, regulation is created directly from public demands for improvements in unfair or ineffective market practices (Posner, 1974). Following the public interest theory, statutory bodies protect citizens' rights and serve the public interest. Furthermore, this idea asserts that statutory bodies should be responsible to the public. The concept also asserts that statutory entities should be accountable to their constituents. Public institutions are established to govern particular aspects of public life, such as housing, health, education, and the environment, and to ensure that these aspects are administered in a way that meets the needs of the general public. Public life encompasses many aspects, including housing, for instance, the Singapore Housing and Development Board, health, education, and the environment.

The Process of the Formation of Statutory Bodies

Statutory entities are often created by government legislation. Statutory bodies are typically founded in the following steps:

Identification of a need: The government may decide that a specialized agency is necessary to handle a particular policy concern, such as consumer protection, environmental protection, or financial regulation; Creation of legislation: A statutory body would generally be established, and its duties, powers, and goals specified by legislation drafted by the government. It is common for the government to enact legislation after it has been finalized, either through a vote in the legislature or by the executive branch; Public scrutiny and consultation may occur before this legislation becomes law; Enactment of legislation: The government typically enacts legislation after it has been finalized. The statutory body is usually run by a board or commission whose members are selected by the government. Positions may be made public, candidates may be chosen through a competitive process, and the legislative branch may ratify the appointment; Operating: After the statutory body has

been created and its leadership has been chosen, it can begin operating, executing its duties, and implementing its policies. A statutory body must be established as transparent, accountable, and successful, and its policies must match the needs and goals of the general public (Quah, 2010).

Distinctive features of statutory bodies

Statutory bodies are formally constituted state organizations. Many government systems use them as examples of organizational survival. In some cases, they predate ministries and departments as core government organizations. Until recently, they have been used more extensively as service providers and regulators than non-ministerial executive bodies and in the management of public enterprises than state/government companies. As circumstances, interests, and demands change, they have proven adaptable (Let Us Explore The Common Ground: Agencies, Public Corporations and Regulatory Commissions on Jstor, n.d.)

The ramifications of statutory bodies on politics, policy, and legislation are evident in both theory and reality. The job of statutory bodies includes conducting policy analyses (Thynne, 2006). Theories and models can be applied to describe the formation of these groups in order to comprehend how government policies should be established. These possibilities can occasionally be considered when examining organizational demands and options. They might perform an extensive and methodical survey to ascertain the needs, demands, interests, values, tasks, and goals of various organizations. Because Singapore's housing and development board was established due to the strong demand for suitable housing, they will then be forced to concentrate more intently, particularly on previous and present arrangements, to determine what is or is not likely to work in specific settings. Evaluation and development are hence gradual and evolutionary processes. Opportunities for action may exist in some circumstances, but they may also be closed due to issues, regulations, etc.

Politics consolidate or divide can occasionally be beyond the control of people directly involved in politics. The multiple rounds of analysis typically involve reviewing domestic and foreign policy files, with some degree of policy copying and transferring, leading to similar designs and practices across various government systems. Problems fixed, obstacles surmounted, and victories achieved in one system might provide significant lessons when applied to another.

From a political standpoint, statutory entities can also serve as a centre for political scheming because they give the executive and legislative branches security and protection. Interest groups, peak bodies, elites, and other self-interested parties can influence legislative and other processes required to establish statutory organizations. A statutory entity that is particularly pertinent to their interests, such as one that is a board or has a board at its top, might be advocated for by the government and other stakeholders in a system, for example. Setting health service or public transportation fees is one of many duties that would benefit from being carried out at a distance by a statutory agency under a covert control system. From a comparative political standpoint, senior officials may contend that statutory bodies are essential for securing governmental and legislative support for a policy or administrative area. Promises and obligations will be made as the bodies function and gain shape. Over time, a body's integration and autonomy will be impacted by the assurance and protection that legislation offers.

There are other instruments through which a government can establish organizations that must protect the main stakeholders and interests. Additionally, they offer different

incentives and opportunities for stakeholders within and outside government to influence organizational decisions. Organizations with constitutions are the only exception to this rule.

The idea of autonomy for statutory bodies has numerous facets. The notion encompasses a variety of forms of autonomy, including administrative, financial, and policy autonomy as well as legal autonomy, which refers to having a separate legal identity from the state. For example, some statutory bodies have legal independence, while others do not; some statutory bodies can set tariffs and take out loans, while others cannot; some statutory bodies can participate in policy development, while others cannot. All these autonomy dimensions can vary for statutory bodies performing similar tasks.

High levels of administrative and policy autonomy may be matched with low levels of financial independence in some statutory bodies. Because of their purpose, size, and political importance, statutory bodies may range in the kind of autonomy they have and to what extent. This results in variances in how several types of autonomy are combined, such as high autonomy.

Low policy autonomy and high managerial autonomy are not necessarily problematic. In some cases, tensions can arise if it is unclear why one statutory body acts in a particular way. Each has been given a different degree of autonomy. It is also the responsibility of the government. It is important to remember that a statutory body's autonomy may affect its autonomy in another area. This statutory body's day-to-day practice becomes less effective as autonomy on other fronts is reduced. In this case, dimensions are lacking. According to this perspective, an agency's overall autonomy is. A balance is achieved by balancing managerial, policy, financial, and legal autonomy.

Statutory Bodies in Singapore

Statutory bodies function as autonomous bodies in Singapore. Statutory bodies in Singapore may also be referred to as statutory boards or, in some cases, as quasi-governmental organizations. To establish them, Parliament adopts explicit acts. The Acts specify their roles, organizational frameworks, legal standing, rights and obligations, and connections to their parent ministries and the relevant ministers, who set important policy parameters, have ultimate executive control over them, and select their top officials. The parent ministries and accountable ministers are in charge of choosing senior executives. They are not a part of the civil service because the people who work for them are not government employees. They can file lawsuits against the government where they are incorporated because they have separate legal identities from the government.

Singapore's well-developed public administration is responsible for its effective operation. In light of this, the People Action Party and its founding leader Lee Kuan Yew realized that it could implement both a healthy economy and an effective welfare system by restructuring the public sector and bringing it up to the levels of efficiency found in prosperous Western nations (Quah, 2010). People Action Party was formed as a result of this realization.

As part of Singapore's administrative reform, the government reorganized the Singapore Civil Service and established new statutory boards. As well as changing the colonial mindset of city officials that were unsympathetic to the problems of the general population, the government wanted to change the colonial mindset of civil servants. Singapore's reform of its public sector would be based on policies and practices developed by the Political Studies Center, which was established as part of this reform. There was a strong political will and strong leadership, continuous innovation, meritocracy, equal opportunity, an effective

performance appraisal, continuous learning, continuous review and development, and the ability to make and carry out difficult decisions.

Three key reforms were implemented in Singapore in the 1980s with the goals of enhancing the public sector's capacity to provide high-quality services and establishing more decentralized financial management. The first reform was the implementation of budget reforms, which are distinguished by the thoroughness, transparency, and fiscal risk of the budget. The second reform involved creating statutory entities, which changed public administration towards a client-oriented model that offers more effective customer-based services. The goal of this project was to help Singapore Civil Service employees shed their colonial mindset. The adoption of meritocracy as a feature of Singapore's government, which entails choosing people based on necessary achievement requirements, was the third reform. Because of these reforms, the Civil Service now has a culture that embraces ongoing change for increased effectiveness and efficiency.

The advancements in the Singapore Civil Service have created a solid infrastructure, a first-rate public housing program, and an excellent educational system, among other things. The Singapore Civil Service is now renowned for its high level of meritocracy, strong emphasis on integrated strategic planning, high capacity to support both public and private companies operations, lack of corruption, and ability to guarantee a high level of technical, scientific, and humanistic knowledge through a cutting-edge educational system.

The following eight characteristics can be found in Singapore's method of public administration(Quah, 2010):

Macro-meritocracy, competition between the public and private sectors for the best talent, low levels of corruption, institutional and attitudinal administrative reforms, reliance on statutory bodies for the execution of socio-economic development programs, effective policy implementation, better public service, and the use of policy diffusion to address issues are all crucial elements.

The study's primary focus on statutory entities is one aspect that distinguishes Singapore's public administration from other systems. Statutory entities support Singapore's administrative structure. They are crucial pillars of the social and economic structure founded upon by the Republic of Singapore to function effectively (Howe, 1979).

Even though it was recognised in 1976 during Singapore's national day parade in honour of the country's 11th year of independence, statutory boards have played a significant part in the growth of Singapore as a nation. The government of Singapore made a conscious decision to create statutory boards to advance national development. Singapore's statutory bodies were established for three main reasons:

First, the challenges that the Singapore civil service faced when trying to put development projects into action were the primary motivation for the establishment of statutory boards in Singapore. Because of the limitations imposed on it by its stringent restrictions and lack of flexibility, the Singaporean civil service was preoccupied mostly with topics pertaining to regulation and routine. In light of these constraints, the government of Singapore came to the conclusion that the most effective way to speed up the implementation of the socioeconomic development plans would be to rely instead on statutory entities. In other words, there existed a separation between the statutory boards in Singapore and the Singapore civil service. The statutory entities of Singapore were in charge of the implementation of socioeconomic development programmes, while the regulatory and routine tasks of government were the responsibility of the Singapore civil service.

Second, the Singaporean government created statutory boards to reduce the country's civil service workload. This was a technique for raising an organization's effectiveness. Singapore used two techniques to achieve this objective: expanding its capabilities and reducing its workload. Singapore is one of the few nations that has successfully combined both approaches to enhance its administrative institutions' efficiency. By implementing numerous training programs, raising the quality of its workforce, and allocating the required funding, the Singaporean government enhanced the capabilities of the Singapore civil service. By either relying on non-governmental organizations and preparing them "to take over a larger share of the burdens of a society" or by creating new governmental or quasi-governmental agencies to handle the overload by dividing it among a small number of organizations, it is possible to reduce the overload of public agencies. Because it enables a more equitable distribution of social responsibilities, each possibility is better than the other (Quah, 1975a). As a result, Singapore has created statutory organizations to carry out the city-state's different development programs in a way that will lighten the burden on its civil service.

The third justification for Singapore's creation of statutory boards is to stop the movement of brilliant public servants into business. This can be achieved by Singapore's statutory boards providing more desirable wages and working conditions than the country's civil service and by seconding Singapore public workers to statutory boards. It is possible to persuade qualified individuals working in private enterprises to join those bodies because the terms of service for statutory boards in private companies are more enticing than those in the Singapore public service.

In Singapore, the governance of statutory bodies is characterized by a centralized and hierarchical approach. The Singaporean government operates with an authoritarian approach, where the governing body has more power over decision-making and policy implementation. This is evident in the appointment of board members for these organizations, where government officials play a significant role. Additionally, the government retains a high level of control over these statutory bodies through regulatory laws and policies.

Having examined the justifications for creating statutory boards, it is critical to understand how the bodies are created. There are five basic ways that statutory boards are created in Singapore, and they are as follows:

1. Established from an already-existing unit or division of a statutory board; for instance, the Urban Redevelopment Authority was established from the Urban Renewal Department of the Housing and Development Board.

2. When a body is "formed from scratch," it indicates it has no prior affiliation with any other statutory boards. An example of this is the 1973 establishment of the Industrial Training Board.

3. Created when a statutory board that had been in place was dissolved, such as the Housing and Development Board, which was created following the dissolution of the Singapore improvement trust.

4. Created through the union of two statutory boards or a government agency.

5. Created through transforming a government agency into a statutory board.

The Public Utilities Board was established to provide the population with electricity, water, and gas. Public housing and urban redevelopment are other primary responsibilities of statutory boards in Singapore. One of Singapore's most effective statutory boards is the

Housing and Development Board. Other primary responsibilities include providing education, promoting tourism, and developing infrastructure and essential services.

Overview of the legal framework for statutory bodies in Singapore

The Constitution of the Republic of Singapore lays out the fundamental principles of governance, including the powers of the government and the legal status of statutory boards. Because of this, the legal framework for statutory bodies in Singapore is based on the Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. In particular, the provisions found in the Constitution's sections 22A and 22B relate to the appointment of members to statutory boards and, more specifically, the distribution of budgets for the operation of those bodies.

Statutory boards are required to comply not just with the Constitution but also with any other applicable laws and regulations. One such law is the Statutory Boards Taxable Services Act of 1968, which states that some services rendered by statutory boards are subject to taxation (*Statutory Boards (Taxable Services) Act 1968 - Singapore Statutes Online*, n.d.). In Singapore, the Public Sector Governance Act 2018 intends to encourage a whole-of-government approach to service delivery and establishes a common governance framework for public bodies in the country (*Public Sector (Governance) Act 2018 - Singapore Statutes Online*, n.d.). Moreover, this act makes consequential adjustments to a number of other acts.

In addition to this, statutory boards have to comply with industry-specific regulations as well. For example, the Housing and Development Board is managed by the Housing and Development Act (*Housing and Development Act 1959 - Singapore Statutes Online*, n.d.), while the Land Transport Authority of Singapore is governed by the Land Transport Authority of Singapore Act (*Land Transport Authority of Singapore Act 1995 - Singapore Statutes Online*, n.d.). Both of these pieces of legislation were enacted in Singapore. Because of these rules and regulations, statutory boards are required to function inside a well-defined legal framework, complete with the governance structures, financial controls, and regulatory monitoring necessary to protect the public interest.

The Housing and Development Board

One of Singapore's most effective statutory boards, the Housing and Development Board, is in charge of managing the country's public housing programme. It was established in 1960 as a direct reaction to Singapore's extreme housing need following the war. When Singapore was founded, there was a housing shortage, and a sizable portion of the population lived in squatter colonies and overcrowded slums. With the intention of offering Singaporeans public housing that is both inexpensive and of sufficient quality, the Housing and Development Board was founded (Quah, 2010).

After the Singapore Improvement Trust was abolished, the Housing and Development Board was created. In order to make preparations for Singapore's improvement, the British colonial administration founded the Singapore Improvement Trust as a statutory body in 1927. The six tasks it carries out include demolishing unhygienic structures, creating a general improvement plan, developing and implementing improvement schemes, providing housing for people who will be displaced as a result of the improvement schemes, buying and managing land, and building back lanes in slum areas.

The Singapore Improvement Trust was first established as a town-planning authority and not as a public housing authority when it was first established. Consequently, the Singapore improvement trust was not tasked with housing Singapore's whole population; instead, it was tasked with relocating only those who were homeless as a direct result of the

trust's projects. The situation started to change in 1932, when the British colonial government granted the Singapore improvement trust the authority to construct new buildings. That same year, the trust constructed its first housing units in Lorong Limau. As a result of the failure of the private sector to construct a sufficient number of homes to satisfy the requirements of the fast-expanding population, the housing shortage became even worse.

The Singapore Improvement Trust was only able to construct a total of 23,264 housing units over the course of 33 years, which means that it built an average of 716 housing units each year from 1927 until 1960. As a result, the Singapore Improvement Trust was not successful in resolving the housing shortage that existed in Singapore (Quah, 2010).

The inefficiency of the Singapore Improvement Trust in resolving the housing shortage may be traced back to a confluence of variables, including those from the outside world as well as those within the organization itself. During the years 1927–1959. Singapore's policy setting in terms of its geography, economics, and people was not conducive to developing the Singapore Improvement Trust's organizational performance. This was the case. Because Singapore is not subject to earthquakes or typhoons, the architects working on the public housing programme were compelled to construct high-rise flats due to a lack of available land. Fortunately, the buildings were safe from natural disasters. Despite this, the Singapore Improvement Trust did not construct high-rise flats since it did not have the necessary resources to take use of these advantages.

During the time that the Singapore Improvement Trust was in operation, there was a significant increase in the population of Singapore, which led to an increase in the need for public housing. The inadequacy of the Singapore Improvement Trust to meet the rising demand for public housing led to the proliferation of squatter colonies in urban and rural regions that needed to be developed. Due to the squatters' resistance to being relocated and the difficulty of the Singapore Improvement Trust to lawfully evict them, construction work in these locations was held up for longer than it should have been. In a nutshell, the problem of squatters caused a significant amount of difficulty in the process of putting the Singapore Improvement Trust's public housing scheme into action.

Another factor in the dissolution of the Singapore Improvement Trust was the need for more policies to guarantee that only the best applicants were hired. The Singapore Development Trust's recruitment and selection practices were carried out by its London-based agent, Peirce and Williams, which chose a straightforward and haphazard approach to employing foreign officials. Only if Peirce and Williams could not track down sufficient candidates residing in other countries in the United Kingdom did the Singapore Improvement Trust employ local officers. Applicants who already lived in Singapore were given preference by the Singapore Improvement Trust. Regardless of the qualifications of local applicants, European applicants were always preferred above them. Hence local people were only ever employed as officers as a last resort. Aside from that, Peirce and Williams' selection procedures were more relaxed than they were. Because of this, persons with European ancestry were occasionally chosen even when they were older than allowed or did not meet the requirements. The Singapore Improvement Trust's recruiting process did not favour Singaporeans over applicants from European countries and was not based on merit.

The Singapore government made the decision to dissolve the Singapore Improvement Trust and replace it with the Housing and Development Board and the Planning Department, both of which now carry out the duties that the Singapore Improvement Trust previously did. This was done because the Singapore Improvement Trust was unable to help Singapore's housing shortage.

The Housing and Development Board initially began its operations by constructing low-cost flats in huge housing estates. These estates were intended to function as self-contained communities and were furnished with conveniences like as schools, stores, and recreational facilities. These apartments were constructed with contemporary building methods and were intended to be both practical and aesthetically pleasing in their final form.

When the Housing and Development Board first began its mission to meet the housing needs of the people of Singapore, it encountered a number of obstacles. There were problems with the construction process, the finance, and the acquisition of property. However, the Housing and Development Board was able to overcome these problems over the course of time and evolved into a model for the creation of public housing.

Today, more than eighty percent of Singapore's population lives in Housing and Development board flats, which are well-known for their reputation for quality, affordability, and effective utilization of space. The Housing and Development Board is responsible for numerous forward-thinking housing solutions, including as the creation of eco-friendly and smart homes, and continues to play an important part in the urban development of Singapore.

In recent years, the Housing and Development Board of Singapore has placed a greater emphasis on the revitalization of older housing estates as well as the development of new towns in order to better cater to the evolving requirements of Singapore's population. As a result of the considerable contributions, it has made to Singapore's economic growth and social cohesion, the Housing and Development Board has emerged as a vital component in the ongoing process of nation-building in Singapore.

Reasons for the establishment of the housing and development board

Housing and Development Board, was created in Singapore for several reasons, including

Singapore was experiencing a severe housing crisis when the Housing and Development Board was established in 1960. The result was overcrowding and unhygienic living conditions for many people. To solve this problem and provide Singaporeans with affordable housing, the Housing and Development Board was established (*How Singapore Solved Their Housing Crisis After WWII - ANDREW FOLKLER, n.d.*).

Secondly, the Housing and Development Board played an essential role in urban transformation in Singapore. Comprehensive town planning policies were developed and implemented as part of the board's efforts to transform Singapore into a modern city-state. New towns and estates were built as part of these strategies.

The third reason is, in order to foster social cohesion and integration among different socioeconomic and racial groups, the Housing Development Board developed its public housing policies (Tan et al., n.d.). Various racial and cultural groups were represented equally in housing estates through ethnic quotas.

In addition, the Housing and Development Board encouraged home ownership to foster a sense of pride and ownership among Singaporeans. Through various programs, such as subsidies from the Central Provident Fund and more favorable loan terms, the Housing and Development Board simplified the home-buying process for citizens.

Public housing was constructed by Housing and Development board and contributed significantly to the country's economic stability (Tan et al., n.d.). As a result of the government's assistance in reducing the financial burden placed on individuals and families

by providing options for affordable housing, they could devote more of their resources to other areas of their lives, such as education, healthcare, and business ventures.

Roles of the Housing and Development Board

The Housing and Development Board is primarily in charge of overseeing the housing sector in Singapore. The board's crucial responsibilities include: Managing all lands in Singapore, homes, and buildings owned by the board. In addition, the board is accountable for lending money, with the approval of the Minister, to people who want to buy any developed land, any housing accommodations, or any other land owned by the board for which a permit has been obtained in whole or in part; The Housing and Development Board acts as an agent for the Government or, with the Minister's approval, as an agent for another public authority in providing such services, within or outside Singapore, based on its expertise acquired in performing its duties under the Housing and Development Board Act. This is in addition to providing technical and consulting services in Singapore. The board also intends to create rural and agricultural regions to relocate those displaced by board operations and other resettlement initiatives approved by the Minister; Estate Administration and Upkeep Public housing estates must be appropriately managed and maintained, according to the Housing and Development Board. It is accountable for offering inhabitants vital services, preserving the estate's cleanliness and landscaping, and providing necessary services, including rubbish collection and grounds upkeep.

To address the housing requirements of Singapore's residents and create sustainable and dynamic living environments, the Housing and Development Board in Singapore performs the aforementioned essential functions.

Reasons for the success of the Housing and Development Board

It is widely recognized that the Housing and Development Board has effectively addressed Singapore's housing crisis and eliminated housing scarcity by housing more than 80% of the population. Housing and Development Board's success can be attributed to various initiatives carried out by the government and the organization, as opposed to its predecessor, the Singapore Improvement Trust, which needed better received by the general public and more government support. Housing and Development Board's achievements can be attributed to four key factors.

A significant difference between the Housing and Development Board and the Singapore Improvement Trust is a clearly defined mission for providing public housing. As a result of focusing solely on public housing, the Housing and Development Board could devote all of its resources and efforts to achieving its objective.

A crucial factor in the success of the Housing and Development Board was its ability to deal with squatters. Unlike the Singapore Improvement Trust, squatters and pig farmers could not be forcibly removed from land required for construction by the Housing and Development Board. Squatting incidents were reduced due to the Housing and Development Board's ability to purchase land more effectively and efficiently.

As well as its high calibre of employees, the Housing and Development Board also takes preventative and corrective measures to minimise corruption within its organisation. In order to ensure the highest quality candidates are selected for open positions, the Housing and Development Board has an in-depth recruitment process, with senior appointments based on merit and achievement. The Singapore Improvement Trust, on the other hand, favors European candidates based on their race rather than their educational background. The

Housing and Developmental Board also uses a standard hiring and selection manual to ensure fairness and equity. Preventing hiring individuals with a history of illegal or corrupt behavior further safeguards the organization's reputation through rigorous screening methods for senior appointments.

The Housing and Development Board has strategically utilized Singapore's resources and adapted local policies to achieve its goals. As part of its anti-corruption measures, the Housing and Development Board has implemented a balloting system for balanced distribution and stringent screening procedures for senior appointments. The Housing and Development Board achieved its overall mission by effectively utilizing Singapore's resources and transforming the policy context to provide public housing on a large scale.

In conclusion, the Housing and Development Board's success in addressing Singapore's housing shortage can be attributed to a combination of factors, including a clearly defined primary objective, legal authority to address squatting, and strategic resource allocation. As a result of the Housing and Development Board's efforts, a substantial portion of the country's population has access to affordable housing, contributing to the economy and society at large.

Statutory Authorities in Australia

The 19th century saw the establishment of all the fundamental components of the Australian public administration system when it was still a confederation of British colonies. The colonies were ruled by governors who answered to London initially but gradually developed their constitutions, legislatures, and administrations and were seen as developing nation-states. Although the phrase was not used then, including this period to map the Australian experience with non-departmental entities is vital. This was the time when 'agencification' was most pronounced.

The creation of Legislative Councils in the 1820s, following the arrival of the first British governor to the Australian colonies, provided the required framework for using statutory bodies for various public objectives. When the eastern colonies became self-governing states with full-fledged parliaments in the late 1850s, numerous boards, including those for education, lands, roads, special bridge construction authorities, sewerage and water supply commissions, immigration boards, and medical boards, were established (Christopher Pollitt et al., 2005).

An early savings bank was run by an incorporated board of trustees (Wettenhall, 1987). A primary motivation for the British central administration was to keep it small and tap into skills and energies not readily available in the civil service. Despite this, early experiences pointed to the rise and ubiquity of statutory authorities or 'public enterprises' that would dominate these Australian developments for several generations.

Statutory authorities have been in use since the earliest days of organized government. Since then, non-departmental forms have been continuously developed in Australia. Australia's statutory bodies' governance style is more decentralized and distributed. In Australia, there is greater autonomy for statutory bodies to make independent decisions in their operations and strategies. However, they are still required to comply with national standards and regulations. This is consistent with Australia's democratic governance style, where governments operate based on the ideals of transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to the needs of its citizens. Furthermore, the Australian government is more inclined towards a proactive governing style for statutory organization (*Proactive Governance Reduces Reactive Compliance*, n.d.).

Statutory authorities in Australia are classified according to their functions, there are three types of namely: commercial service delivery; non-commercial service delivery and regulatory:

Regulatory agencies that oversee the provision of commercial services seek commercial goals, albeit they are frequently weighed against public service considerations. They are typically under the direction and control of ministers, but the power is usually restrained to reflect their business goals. Employees may work for the authority directly or for the public sector. Commercial statutory authorities typically produce the majority or a sizable percentage of their own income. The Urban Renewal Authority and HomeStart Finance are two statutory authorities in this category. Non-commercial service delivery statutory authorities frequently work toward social goals or offer particular services for the public good. Though it is typically restricted to organizational choices or counsel content, they are typically subject to a high level of ministerial control. Although they may occasionally impose fees on clients, government grants typically account for the majority of the revenue for operations. The South Australian SACE Board, the Green Industries SA Board, and the Art Gallery Board are a few examples of legislative authorities in this category. Statutory regulatory organizations can make decisions and frequently publish standards or recommendations. They may also carry out disciplinary or enforcement duties, such as identifying compliance violations. Their independence from the government is essential to meet the demand for objectivity. Regulators may get government grants in addition to raising money through the application of fines and charges. The Dairy Authority of Australia, the Education and Early Childhood Services Registration and Standards Board of Australia, and Environment Protection Authority are a few examples of statutory authorities in this area.

Overview of the legal framework for statutory bodies in Australia

The Public Governance, Performance, and Accountability Act of 2013¹(Finance, n.d.) lays the groundwork for a governance and accountability framework that applies to all Commonwealth entities. All accountable authorities and officials working for Commonwealth organizations must comply with the Public Governance Performance and Accountability Act. Not only does it create principles for financial management, but it also establishes norms for broader governance, performance, and responsibility for the Commonwealth public sector.

The Privacy Act of 1988 (also known as the Privacy Act) was passed to support and uphold people's right to privacy and to control how specific other organizations, including Australian government agencies and businesses with annual revenue of more than \$3 million, handle personal information about people.

The Privacy Act (*The Privacy Act | OAIC*, n.d.) includes thirteen Australian Privacy Principles, which apply to several organizations in the private sector in addition to the majority of government bodies in Australia. The term "APP entities" refers to all these things together. In addition, the Consumer Credit Reporting System, Health and Medical Research and Tax File Numbers, are all subject to the Privacy Act's regulations for their respective privacy components.

The statutory authorities in Australia mainly focus on providing services in: Road and traffic safety, public transport, collection of taxes, corporate law, consumer affairs, prudential regulation, monetary policy, workplace health and safety, communications and media and offshore petroleum activities. As in Singapore, statutory authorities were established in

¹ www.legislation.gov.au

Australia for similar reasons. A lack of time and resources in Australia's state and federal parliaments makes examining, analyzing, developing, and monitoring laws challenging. To improve efficiency, statutory authorities were established in Australia.

The competent statutory authorities were responsible for these matters. Establishing statutory authorities in Australia was also an effort to improve the country's level of openness and accountability; statutory authorities are required to comply with greater disclosure requirements than state and federal legislatures; statutory authorities cannot rely on the same government secrets provisions as state and federal governments.

Establishing statutory authorities was done to encourage accountability; the statutory authority's jurisdiction is outlined in the Act that founded it, such as the Act of Parliament. For this reason, statutory authorities were also created. Officers of the statutory authority will find it more difficult to deflect, share, or avoid responsibility in the case of a scandal. As a result, statutory authorities are typically in charge of those parts of the law that profit from a common goal or direction. This is a critical step towards fostering bipartisanship. These legal domains can be shielded from becoming political by transferring authority away from the parliament.

The following conditions must be met for these statutory authorities to be established:

First, they had to stay out of circumstances where they would be subject to political control or complete political accountability. This includes quasi-judicial or regulatory functions, those involving grants or subsidies, and those dealing with opinion formation or research at the university level.

Secondly, when performing commercial operations was necessary, for example, when competing with private enterprises, or when independent counsel or review of policies was needed, they also needed to escape departmental procedures and controls.

Three. Detailed and independent tasks needed to be released from ministers' daily responsibilities. State parliaments and the Federal Parliament of Australia have been given the authority to enact new laws in several distinct areas. These areas include consumer affairs, road and traffic safety, public transportation, tax collection, corporate law, prudential regulation, monetary policy, workplace health and safety, communications and media, and offshore petroleum activities.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission oversee consumer affairs, while VicRoads in Victoria is responsible for road and traffic safety. It was established in 2010 as the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Several state organizations, such as the Public Transport Authority in Western Australia, are also responsible for managing public transportation systems.

The Australian Taxation Office collects taxes, while the Australian Securities and Investments Commission handles business law. The Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority supervises prudential regulations.

The Reserve Bank of Australia makes monetary policy decisions under the Reserve Bank Act 1959. The Act also assigned several specific duties and tasks to the Reserve Bank of Australia. Safe Work Australia and several state organizations manage workers' health and safety, including WorkSafe in Victoria and its subsidiaries, including Accident Compensation Conciliation Service.

As a result, the Australian Communications and Media Authority oversees media and communication in Australia, while the National Offshore Petroleum Safety and Environmental Management Authority (NOPSEMA) regulates offshore petroleum operations (*Home / NOPSEMA*, n.d.).

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

This section focuses on the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, a statutory body that promotes fair trading, competition, and product safety to benefit consumers, businesses, and the Australian community. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission was established in 1995 and is the government's chief competition regulator. It is housed within the Treasury Department. In addition to promoting consumer and business rights, regulating the industry, monitoring prices, and preventing illegal anticompetitive conduct, this organization is among Australia's statutory authorities. Consumers' legal rights and the legal obligations of businesses are primarily protected by it. To administer the Trade Practices, Act of 1974, now known as the Competition and Consumer Act of 2010, this agency was formed by merging the Australian Trade Practices Commission and the Prices Surveillance Authority ("About the ACCC," 2012).

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, the Treasury, the Data Standards Board, and the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner handle certain accountability measures under Consumer Data Rights. In addition to maintaining close relationships with the entities responsible for Consumer Data Rights, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission engages regularly with other government stakeholders. The Australian Prudential Regulation Authority, the Australian Energy Regulator, and the Australian Communications and Media Authority are among these stakeholders.

Additionally, this statutory authority engages with international counterparts through membership or participation in international regulatory organizations and multilateral forums, including the International Competition Network, including membership in the Steering Group of the International Competition Forum; International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network; Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, including the Competition Policy and Law Group; Organization for Economic Cooperation. As an independent statutory entity, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is organized as follows:

The members of the Commission include a Chair, two deputy chairs, members, and associate members; the organizational structure of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission includes the Chair, the agency head, and the chief executive officer; the Digital Transformation Committee; the Competition Committee; the Consumer Data Right Committee; the Consumer and Fair Trading Committee; the Consumer Product Safety Committee; the Corporate Committee; the Infrastructure Committee; the Mergers; Specialist advice and services and Corporate.

Commission members are appointed by the governor general for five-year terms. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is the major decision-making body. In most states and territories, an appointment requires the approval of the state or territory. Australian Public Service employees work for the Australian Competition and Competition Commission.

Reasons for the establishment of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

Several important reasons led to the establishment of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission: Firstly, Enhancing Competition in the Australian Market. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's primary goal is to increase competition in the Australian market. In order to improve product quality, lower prices, and expand customer options, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission works to ensure a competitive environment.

Secondly, protecting the interests of consumers is another essential objective of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission. Its responsibilities include monitoring and enforcing consumer protection laws regarding deceptive advertising, product safety, unfair contract conditions, and anti-competitive behavior.

Moreover, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission strive to prevent market dominance abuses by investigating and pursuing anti-competitive behavior. Among these practices are price-fixing, bid-rigging, and other forms of collaboration. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission investigates and deals with anti-competitive actions. This prevents a few companies from concentrating power and keeps firms on an equal playing field.

In addition, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission regulates essential businesses such as telecommunications, energy, and water, which are crucial to the Australian economy. Encouraging investment and innovation in new products and services ensures that these industries operate pretty, effectively, and in the best interests of their customers.

In addition. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission evaluates mergers, acquisitions, and other corporate combinations to minimize potential adverse effects on competition. Regulating these transactions ensures that the competition in the relevant markets is not substantially diminished or consumers are not hurt. Furthermore, it prevents consumers from being adversely affected by these transactions.

Finally, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission is actively involved in several advocacy and educational programs to increase awareness about consumer and competition issues. Businesses and customers are given information, direction, and resources to make educated decisions and better understand their rights and responsibilities.

Roles of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

To implement the provisions of the Competition and Consumer Act(Treasury, n.d.), the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission can bring legal challenges before the Federal Court of Australia. There are several laws in the Competition and Consumer Act, some of which govern anti-competitive behavior, others the Australian Consumer Law, and others the regulation of the energy and telecommunications industries. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission govern several different business sectors by controlling access to various aspects of the nation's infrastructure under the authority granted to it by the Act. Additionally, this authority promotes fair business practices and protects consumers from misleading and deceptive conduct.

As a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, Australia experienced a shortage of rapid antigen tests between the end of December 2021 and the end of January 2022. It resulted from increased demand due to new work and travel requirements, and it was compounded by issues with global logistics and the supply chain caused by the pandemic. Responding to the shortfall, consumers cited various concerns, including excessive pricing, delayed delivery, false and misleading claims, and package splitting. Inventory shortages caused the shortage.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission engaged with over 70 businesses in response to these issues. Businesses in this category included large retailers, pharmacy chains, and test providers. Although the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission determined that some merchants had violated the Australian Consumer Law, it does not have the power to regulate prices. However, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission reminded retailers of their obligations under the Australian Consumer

Law. They referred pertinent matters to the Australian Federal Police and Therapeutic Goods Administration to enforce resale mark-ups and test package splitting regulations. With the advent of quick antigen testing in March 2022, costs dropped to levels similar to those seen before the peak.

Per the Act on Competition and Consumer Matters in Australia, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission aims to educate consumers and businesses about their rights and responsibilities. In addition to its many other functions, the Commission has an educational function.

The Australian Energy Regulator, a component of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, regulates the economy's energy use in Australia. Even though it has its board, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission with which it shares staff and offices must also have at least one member serving on the independent board.

Reasons for the success of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission

As an independent body, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission ensures fair competition, protects consumers, and promotes the well-being of Australian businesses. Several factors have contributed to the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission's success.

The national competition council's research and advisory functions are essential for the Commission's success (National Competition Council (Australia), 1999). The council's primary functions are to assess the government's progress in implementing competition reforms and undertake projects as requested, such as reviewing and providing advice on restrictive and anti-competitive legislation, reforming public monopolies, controlling prices, and maintaining competitive neutrality.

As a result of the Competition and Consumer Act of 2010, the Commission's practices are up-to-date and effective. The act protects and promotes market competition to benefit consumers, businesses, and the community. Moreover, it investigates anti-competitive business behavior that may be legal, enforces anti-competitive behavior laws and takes action against businesses that violate them.

Its approach to competition has also contributed to the Commission's success. Unlike other regulatory agencies, the Commission is not philosophically opposed to competition. With this foresight, collective agreements that could harm consumers can be evaluated correctly. A critical component of the Commission's success is its approach to market studies and inquiries. In addition to collecting necessary information and documents, these studies and inquiries can lead to critical regulatory reforms and changes in commercial practices, as well as identify market failures and determine how to remedy them.

Six market studies have been done by the Commission since 2015, covering topics such as customer loyalty programs, wine grape markets, agricultural machinery, cattle and beef processing, new car retailing, and communications in general. Regarding anti-competitive or other actions in Australia's private health insurance market, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission issues annual reports to the Australian Senate.

Market studies and inquiries have become essential to the Commission's work. They have been widely employed throughout the economy, generating significant results for Australians in ways that traditional enforcement and compliance instruments could not. The Commission, governments, industry, and consumers can make better-informed decisions by expanding their use.

The market research tool is an integral part of the competition agency's toolkit: First of all, market studies enable "deep dive" fact discovery so that the agency can gather facts methodically and present a clear picture to consumers, the government, and the industry participants of how markets work. The importance of transparency in public policy decisions that influence market operations and consumer welfare cannot be overstated. Tools for enforcement and compliance need to be improved for this purpose. Second, market research can discover illegal behavior that harms competition or customers that would otherwise go undetected. The Digital Platforms Inquiry and the Retail Electricity Pricing Inquiry are examples. Thirdly, market studies ensure the right public policy tool is employed for each policy challenge. Market studies primarily concern competition, consumer protection, and economic regulation. However, adjacent policy areas that affect consumers and competition, such as privacy concerns examined by the Digital Platforms Inquiry, are also inevitably examined.

The Commission's success has also been attributed to its leadership style. After decades of anti-competition legislation and policy, notably after 40 years of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, some highlights may be helpful for other public regulatory agencies striving to achieve institutional status. Leadership must know the organization's historical legacy and the resources available to improve its internal capability for regulatory missions while maintaining external credibility. For the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, for instance, legacy characteristics that brought and protected ongoing institutional reinforcement include proper protection of expert and strategic decision-making from partisan influence, a variety of internal regulation instruments, external constituencies that can be mobilized to adapt to new environments, and leaders who can effectively convey the value and focus of internal agency missions to external stakeholders. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission push the necessary legal and organizational limitations despite its strong leadership integrity and skill to ensure the continuous social relevance of its activities. Consequently, the firm has recruited a professional cadre of dependable, driven, and consistent individuals.

Similarities and Differences Between Statutory Bodies in Singapore and Australia

Both Singapore and Australia's statutory bodies have a governance structure that includes a board of directors or commissioners who are responsible for overseeing their operations. These boards are typically appointed by the government and are accountable for the overall performance of statutory bodies. Singapore and Australia's statutory bodies share a lot of other similarities as well, including the fact that both countries' statutory bodies have a governance structure that includes a board of directors or commissioners. In terms of accountability, statutory bodies in Singapore and Australia are accountable to the general public as well as to the governments of their respective countries. These bodies are required to report on their operations, finances, and performance, and they must also make their findings available to the general public.

The other thing that both countries have in common is that they both have statutory bodies that perform regulatory functions. For example, Singapore has the Monetary Authority of Singapore, which regulates financial affairs, and the Accounting and Corporate Regulatory Authority, which regulates corporate affairs.

Financial issues in Australia are regulated by statutory bodies such as the Australian Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, respectively. These bodies were established by the Australian government.

The last thing that statutory bodies in both countries have in common is that they were established with the purpose of safeguarding the public interest. This involves ensuring that individuals and organizations comply with regulations, enforcing compliance, and investigating any legal infractions that may have occurred.

The main difference of statutory bodies in Singapore and Australia is the governance style. There is a centralized, hierarchical approach to statutory body governance in Singapore. Singapore's government operates authoritarian, where the governing body has more power over decision-making and policy implementation. The government plays a significant role in appointing board members for these organizations. In addition, the government maintains high control over these statutory bodies through regulatory laws and policies.

On the other hand, the governance style of statutory bodies in Australia is more decentralized and distributed. Australian statutory bodies have greater autonomy to make independent decisions about their operations and strategies. Nevertheless, they must comply with national standards and regulations. Australia operates on transparency, accountability, and responsiveness to its citizens, consistent with its democratic governance style. The Australian government is more inclined to adopt a proactive governing style for statutory organizations. Governing bodies in Australia are more involved in policymaking and may attempt to influence operational management. Australia's proactive governing style is also evident in its wave of privatizations and corporatization in the 1990s, thanks to the 'new public management' movement (Aulich & O'Flynn, 2007).

There is also a distinction in the function that statutory bodies play in the government of these two countries. In Singapore, statutory bodies play a more important role in governance, to the point that they frequently take on functions that, in other nations, would be undertaken by other government agencies. In contrast, statutory entities in Australia have a more restricted role in governance. Statutory bodies in Australia are frequently focused on specific functions such as the regulation of industries and the provision of specialized services.

Conclusion

This study has conducted an examination and comparison of the statutory bodies in Singapore and Australia, shedding light on their organizational structures, roles and responsibilities, and modes of governance. In summary, this research has examined and contrasted the regulatory entities in Singapore and Australia. The primary discoveries suggest that there exist significant similarities and differences between the legislative bodies of these two nations.

Both Singapore and Australia have established statutory organisations that are equipped with boards responsible for governance and supervision. Both nations engage in this technique. The governing bodies bear responsibility for the overall success of the organization, and their separate governments are tasked with the appointment of these governing bodies. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that both nations prioritize the notion of accountability to both the citizenry and the governing bodies. Moreover, they have demonstrated their dedication to transparency through the practice of reporting and public disclosure.

However, the various kinds of governance exhibit significant differences among themselves. The operational structure of Singapore's statutory bodies adheres to a centralized and hierarchical architecture, reflecting the prevailing authoritarian governing style in the country. The government exercises a substantial degree of authority in the process of making appointments and enacting legislation. In contrast, Australia adopts a decentralized

approach, whereby statutory organisations are granted increased discretionary authority in decision-making processes, while simultaneously assuring their adherence to national standards. This aligns with the democratic principles of accountability, transparency, and receptiveness that are observed throughout the Australian governmental system.

Furthermore, empirical evidence has demonstrated that the functions performed by various statutory entities are inherently separate and unique. In the context of Singapore, these organisations often assume a wider range of governance responsibilities that would often fall under the purview of government agencies in other nations. In Australia, statutory bodies exhibit a greater degree of specialization compared to its counterparts in other nations, primarily focusing on industry regulation and the delivery of specialized services.

Based on the aforementioned findings, it is advisable for Singapore to persistently evaluate the equilibrium between centralization and autonomy across the many statutory entities, with the aim of ensuring optimal efficiency and upholding public confidence. Australia may consider exploring the potential for augmenting the existing specialty roles performed by these organisations, with the aim of maximizing their effectiveness and productivity.

This comparative analysis examines the governance structures and practices of statutory bodies in Singapore and Australia, providing valuable insights. The findings of this study serve as a foundation for further research and policy deliberations in both nations. This comparative analysis of statutory bodies in Singapore and Australia provides significant contributions in terms of relevant insights.

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