

The Nature of Internal Security Problems in African States: The Nigerian Experience

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Abstract

This paper examined the nature of internal security problems of African States using Nigeria as a case study. The paper sought to identify the plethora of security challenges confronting Nigeria with specific emphasis on the Niger Delta Crises, Kidnapping in the South-East geopolitical zone, Jos Crises and Boko Haram Crises in the Northern part of Nigeria. The study investigated the extent to which man-tailored internal security problems impacted negatively or otherwise on socio-economic development of the Nigerian State, especially since 1999. The study adopted secondary data as its methodological orientation. The result of the analyses revealed that the national security policy of Nigeria which internal security is a sub-unit was weak to tackle violent security problems that confronted the country. This was partly because, policy makers lacked requisite knowledge to formulate robust internal security policies and effective strategies to mitigate insurgencies in the country. Rather, ad hoc security outfits have continued to dominate internal security governance in Nigeria since 1999. Therefore, the paper recommended among others, the need for recruitment of well-educated, versatile, honest and committed policy makers for the country through credible electoral process.

Keywords: Internal Security, Public Policy, African Development.

Introduction

The security of lives and property of the citizens has continued to attract mixed reactions among individuals, groups and states in the contemporary world. The responsibility of achieving adequate security in a given social formation rests squarely on government which is undoubtedly regarded as the agent of the society. As a complex concept, security means different thing to different people. Its complexity notwithstanding, security connotes the elimination of anxiety, fear and anything capable of threatening the core values and survival of the state as well as her people. According to Booth (1991), security is conceived as freedom from threat, acts of violence and loss of property. It means protection from threats to life and

means of livelihood, safety from bodily harm, freedom from fear of diseases, unemployment, violent conflicts and human right violation (booth, 1991).

However, the above definition reflects the variant of security generally referred to as human security. This is succinct because, human security deals substantially with factors capable of improving or undermining the very existence of man in every human society. Indeed, the inability of any state to address issues capable of threatening the lives and property of citizens of the state as well as guaranteeing rapid socio-economic development for the well-being of man, most often lead to insecurity.

In most African States, security problems are no longer news. This is because, most African States shortly after independence between 1960s-1990s witnessed plethora of security problems which have continued to cascade development in the continent. In Nigeria for instance, such security problems range from Niger Delta Crises, Jos Crises, Kidnapping, Boko Haram Crises, armed robbery, rape, murder, ritual killing, cyber crime, drug trafficking, human trafficking to non-violent security challenges like HIV/AIDS, Cholera, Ebola disease, Bird flu, among others. The above security challenges in Nigeria are regarded as internal security problems. Specifically, the Nigeria's internal security problems affect both the country's economy (rape, murder, cyber crime, armed robbery, drug trafficking, etc), and the statehood (Niger Delta crises, Jos crises, kidnapping, terrorism/Boko Haram crises). The inability of the government to address the above internal security problems in Nigeria appears to be responsible for perennial crises confronting the Nigeria's socio-political and economic development.

In view of the implications of Nigeria's internal security problems on peace, unity and rapid development, this paper attempts a critical examination of the nature of the country's internal security problems with a view to redress them.

Internal Security Problems In Nigeria Since 1999

The Nigerian State is bedeviled with different problems. This ranges from problem of succession to power, one party rule, unreliability of the electoral process, economic crises, ethnic conflicts, political violence, poor infrastructural decay, high rate of poverty, high rate of illiteracy, corruption, to menace of HIV/AIDS. These problem have persistently posed serious threats to internal security of the country. In terms of the nature of security problems facing Nigeria, the country has its peculiar internal security problem, and this has been corroborated by some observers who argued that security threats to states in Africa differ from one another (Sage, 2010). In Nigeria, there are several security problems that raise questions on the capacity of governments to guarantee adequate protection of lives and property of the citizens. This range from armed robbery, kidnapping, militancy, terrorism, rape, murder, ritual killings, ethno-religious conflicts, communal conflicts, HIV/AIDS, among others.

However, a critical look at the above security threats shows that Nigeria faces more violent security threats than non-violent threats like HIV/AIDS, Ebola disease, cholera etc. Thus, the Nigeria's conventional security problem affect both the statehood and the national economy. The security problems in Nigeria and their assumed impacts on statehood and the economy are presented in table 1 below:

Table 1:

Security problems that impacted negatively on the statehood and economy of the Nigerian State between 1999-2014.

S/N	Security problem	Impact
1	Armed Robbery	Economy
2	Kidnapping	Statehood and economy
3	Militancy	Statehood and economy
4	Terrorism / Boko Haram	Statehood and economy
5	Rape	Economy
6	Murder	Economy
7	Ritual killing	Economy
8	Ethno-religious conflicts	Economy
9	Communal conflicts	Economy
10	HIV/AIDS	Economy
11	Ebola Disease	Economy

Source: Nwagboso's field survey, 2015.

From table 1 above, it is evident that Nigeria faces serious security problems. Thus, out of the eleven (11) security problems identified above, eight (8) impacted negatively on the economy of the Nigerian State, while three (3) impacted negatively on the both the national economy and the statehood. The security problems that may have impacted negatively on the statehood include kidnapping, militancy and terrorism/Boko Haram. Thus, these involve armed groups challenging the legal authority of the state with reference to protection of lives and property of the citizens. The primary duty of the state is to protect lives and property of the citizens. Thus, the mechanism for achieving this lofty objective by state is through effective and result-oriented internal security policy. Consequently, a state that is unable to guarantee the security and safety of its citizens often lose its legitimacy and most times attributed as a failed state.

In analyzing Nigeria's developmental challenges from the perspective of internal security problems, the former Military Head of States, General Abdusalami Abubakar argued that the first approach to address the country's perennial problems involves managing internal tendencies, especially security issues and problems that have adversely impacted on economic development (Abubakar, 2005). He further explains:

In addressing the challenge to the survival of democracy in Nigeria, it is pertinent to consider security issues and problems that have affected or capable of affecting the attitude, confidence and cooperation of all groups and segments that make up the Nigerian federation... Beyond the effects of security concerns on the economic fortunes of the country, the nature of security challenges facing the country also have implications for the country's political system...there is the challenge to rethink and improve on policy and institutional means of dealing with security concerns arising in the country... (Abubakar, 2005).

The above observation underscores the need to find out the extent to which this problem has impacted negatively not only on the economy of the Nigerian state, but also on

the political development of the country. As it is generally acknowledged, development cannot be achieved in an environment characterized by insecurity. Therefore, the attainment of meaningful standard of economic development in Nigeria is achievable through affective implementation of internal security policy which must integrate and recognize critical issues like unemployment, poverty, equitable distribution of resources and better mechanism for conflict prevention and management in Nigeria.

However, some security problems in Nigeria are rooted from the perceived inequality in the country's political space, high rate of poverty in the land, increasing spate of unemployment, inequitable distribution of national resources, corruption among top governmental officials, poor management of communal conflicts by appropriate governmental institutions, among others. These inadequacies of both the state and the people have continued to retard meaningful socio-economic development in the contemporary Nigerian State (Abubakar, 2005).

This pathetic scenario, however, explains why some observers of the country's helpless internal security challenges have continued to query rhetorically, what are the overall objectives of the Nigeria's national security policy which internal security policy is a sub-unit? What are the implementation strategies? What factors appear to militate both national and internal security programme implementation in Nigeria since 1999? Thus, a careful examination of the Nigeria's national security policy will undoubtedly provide useful insights and better understanding of this phenomenon under investigation.

Objectives of the National Security Policy of Nigeria and Implementation Strategies

National security is an interactive and integrative system consisting of the individual as the irreducible basic unit, who is connected both to the state and the international political system by way of civil society ... the state is the strongest entity for the enhancement of national security issues, but is increasingly being challenged by civil society which demands a larger role... (Buzan, 1991).

The central pillar of Nigeria's national security policy is the preservation of the safety of Nigerians at home and abroad and the protection of the sovereignty of the country as well as the integrity of her state (Bassey, 2011). Other subordinate goals include:

- i. To safeguard the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Nigerian states;
- ii. To defend the African unity and independence;
- iii. Non-intervention in the internal affairs of other states;
- iv. Involvement in regional economic development and security cooperation and;
- v. Attainment of military self-sufficiency and regional leadership.

The achievement of the above policy objectives in Nigeria appears to pose serious challenges to government. These objectives not only require strong political commitment by the government but also the determination of the Nigerian citizens to ensure their success as several domestic factors often impinge on policy efficacy in most countries in the contemporary world. Thus, the achievement of the internal dimension of the Nigeria's national security objectives has remained elusive despite several strategies adopted by the government. However, Nigeria has persistently been faced with several threats to her internal security. As Bassey rightly noted, the internal threats are those issues that distort the socio-political and economic balance of the nation (Bassey, 2011). These include:

- a. Ethnic and religious militias that are well-armed and semi-trained to carryout raids, ambushes and even assault against law-abiding citizens.
- b. Inter-border and inter-communal conflicts; and
- c. Unemployment, especially among the youths with subversive and criminal behaviours leading to economic sabotage and threatening of civil economic installation, especially in the oil sector.

Consequently, while it is the traditional role of the military to check external aggression against the state, the army is implicitly relevant in monitoring the activities of various actors in the domestic sphere that manifestly pose danger to the society (Bassey, 2011; Eminue, 2006). In internal security management, such as the protection of lives and property of citizens in Nigeria, the role of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), is obviously relevant and indispensable. The NPF perform conventional police functions and is responsible for internal security generally. This includes supporting the prisons, immigration and customs; and performing military duties within or outside Nigeria as directed (NPF Public Relation Department, 2011).

Thus, available evidence shows that the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) has been incapacitated in tackling the increasing rate of internal security problems in Nigerian, especially during the period under review. According to the Public Relation Department of the organization, the NPF experiences endemic problems with recruitment, training, inefficiency and indiscipline. Also, the Force according to PPRD (2011), lacks expertise in specialized fields. Further, the Force is challenged with corruption and dishonesty among its rank and file. These engender low level public confidence on the institution. Thus, crime prevention, detention and investigation are compounded by failure of the Force to report crimes accurately (Nigerian Police Watch, 2011).

The above challenges of the NPF to effectively implement internal security policy of Nigeria are further exacerbated by poor institutional capacity of the institution in terms of manpower and logistics. As at 2011, available statistics shows that the staff strength of the Nigerian Police Force was estimated at 371, 000. Thus, this figure is grossly low considering Nigeria's national population which is about 164,000,000 as at 2011. This statistics implies that one police officer is expected to police or monitor the activities of 442 Nigerians in view of the ratio of 1:442.

Comparatively, the statistics of the manpower capacity of the South African Police Service (SAPS) is far better than that of Nigeria. With a national population of 49,320,500 as at 2009, the staff strength of South African Police Service (SAPS), was 189,546. This means that one police officer is therefore expected to monitor or 'police' 260 residents thereby given a ratio of 1:26. (SAPSPRD, 2011). However, the inadequacies of the police institution to effectively tackle violent crimes including terrorism (Boko Haram crises, Jos crises, kidnapping /militancy), ultimately resulted to the involvement of the Armed Forces of the Federal Republic of Nigerian in internal security governance. The Nigerian Armed Forces (NAF), is made up of the Nigerian Army, Nigerian Navy, Nigerian Air Force and the Nigerian Police Force. Thus, the personnel strength of the Nigerian Armed Forces has remained a critical challenge to effective internal security policy implementation in the Nigerian State, especially since the return of democratic governance in 1999.

As a country with pervasive cases of insecurity, the capacity of Nigeria's Armed Forces in terms of personnel strength, funding, sophistication of equipment, deployment and rapid emergency response, are grossly low (Aliyu, 2011). However, the data presented in table 2

below provides cogent insight into Nigeria's poor level of national security preparedness, with respect to internal dimension of the national security policy implementation.

Table 2:

Personnel strength of the Police and Military institutions in Nigeria

S/N	Security Agencies	Personnel strength	National population	ratio
1	Police	371,000	164,000.000	1:442
2	Army	130,000	164,000.000	1:1,261
3	Navy	15,000	164,000.000	1:10,933
4	Air force	18,000	164,000.000	1:9,111

Source: Daily Independence Newspaper, September 28, 2011.

From table 2 above, the Nigeria Police (NPF) has the highest number of personnel, followed by the Army, Navy and the Air Force. The personnel of these institutions as presented in table 2 are grossly low considering the nature of security problems facing Nigeria. From the above table, the NPF has 371,000 personnel, Army 130,000, Navy 15,000 and Air force 18,000. These figures are grossly low considering Nigeria's population of 164,000.000 as at 2011. This argument could be justified with a critical look at the analysis of personnel strength of the military and paramilitary personnel in selected countries as presented in table 3 below:

Table 3:

Comparative analysis of military and paramilitary personnel capacity of selected countries as at 2010.

S/N	Country	Active military	Reserve military	Para-military	Total	Total per 1000 capita	Active per 1000 capita
1	Cuba	49,000	1,159,000	26,500	1,234,500	107.4	4.3
2	Malaysia	109,000	296,300	24,600	429,900	16.7	4.2
3	Brazil	327,710	1,340,000	0	1,667,710	8.4	1.6
4	Egypt	468,500	479,000	397,000	1,344,500	17	5.9
5	Australia	59,023	21,850	0	80,873	3.8	2.8
6	France	351,771	70,300	46,3900	469,461	7.3	5.5
7	Nigeria	80,000	0	82,000	162,000	1.1	0.5
8	United Kingdom	197,782	212,400	0	410,180	6.7	3.2
9	South Africa	45,082	15,071	12,382	89,535	1.8	1.3
10	United States of America	1,458,219	1,458,500	11,035	2,927,754	9.3	4.6

Source: Adapted from Hacket (2010).

From table 3 above, it is evident that a country with large active military and paramilitary personnel may not be deficient with active men and women for the services of the country. If a country like Nigeria could have just 162,000 military and paramilitary personnel and adjudged to be active implicit in the above figures, it is expected that the NPF should have made impressive efforts to reduce the spate of insecurity without necessarily dragging the armed forces into domestic politics of the and internal security governance of

the country. Also, the data of security institutions as presented in table 3 is grossly inadequate to handle both internal and external security challenges of the Nigerian State which have continued to attract global attention.

Another critical issue worthy of note is the budgetary allocation to defense sector in Nigeria. In the last ten years, an analysis of Nigeria's defense allocation indicates lack of political will on the part of the Federal Government to address security challenges confronting the country. This is evidenced from the allocation made by the Federal Government to Defense sector, between 2008-2011, as presented in table 4 below:

Table 4:

Analysis of Nigeria's defense allocation as a percentage of the national budget between 2008-2011.

2008	2009	2010	2011
5.75%	5.78%	5.69%	8.48%

Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2011.

From table 4 above, the annual budgetary allocation to defense which security is an integral part of it, has left much to be desired. The slight increase to the sector was made in 2011 (8.48%). This sudden increase was largely due to severe attacks by Boko Haram terrorist group against the Nigerian State. The total amount allocated to the defence sector in 2011, although comparatively small to defence allocation in the United States of America in the same year (2011), also attracted serious criticism from the Nigerian citizens, who argued that such lofty amount ought to have been budgeted to alleviate abject poverty, unemployment, inequality, revamp agricultural sector and drastically close the gap between the rich and poor.

Notwithstanding the above criticisms, Nigeria has several security formations (military and paramilitary), that participate in internal security management. Thus, to respond to the challenges posed by insecurity in the country, a comic inclusive security approach was adopted which led to the establishment of Joint Task Force (JTF). The security formations or agencies whose roles are critical to internal security policy implementation in Nigeria include; the Nigeria Army, Navy, Air force, the Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Prison Service, Nigerian Immigration Service, Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps, Nigerian Custom Service, State Security Service and National Drug Laws Enforcement Agency. The understanding of decision-making process and span of control with reference to security policy making and implementation framework in Nigeria is presented in Fig. 1 below:




Fig 1: Structures for Implementation of Nigeria’s National Security Policy.

Source: Nwagboso’s field survey, 2015

However, the strategies adopted to implement the national security policy objectives of Nigeria appear not to have addressed different types of security problems facing the country. The current conception of the Nigeria’s internal security which is an integral part of the overall national security framework, is at best state-centric and society-centred. As some leaders have critically argued, the ultimate goal of addressing the security threats and challenges facing Nigeria is not just to safeguard the lives of the common man, but to protect the lives and the loots of the ruling class (Fayemi, 2003).

Thus, between 2001-2011, the Nigerian state witnessed several security challenges from the country’s internal political environment. These challenges as some observers argued may be due largely to poor implementation strategies adopted by the government and her security appointees to tackle the country’s multifarious security problems. Hence, Akinterinwa (2001) puts the above problem in clear perspectives:

...security appointees have failed the President, Chief Olusegun Obasanjo. If we are to judge the current state of affairs in the country... Nigeria is in a state of lawlessness... it is a shame when the Attorney General of the Federation and Minister of Justice gets killed so easily. The aggressive posturing Odua People’s Congress, robbery, drug trafficking, advanced free fraud (419), unemployment, high price of commodities ... are realities being faced in the country that require remedies...

The above observation underscores the relevance of affective policy strategy to implement the country’s internal security policy. This observation reinforces the argument by Dye who argued that:

Implementation is the continuation of politics by other means.

Policy making does not end with the making of a new law... and it’s signing by the President. Implementation involves all the activities designed to carry out the policies enacted by the legislative branch. These activities include the creation of new organizations, departments, agencies, bureaus, and so on... (Dye, 1965).

The above argument by Dye further reinforced the assertion by some scholars and analysts that the internal security policy of Nigeria appears to have failed to take cognizance of the “unusual suspects” or what Nnoli comically referred to as the “real enemies of the people” (Nnoli, 2006). The “unusual suspects” or ‘real enemies of the people’ which revolve around the economic misfortune of Nigeria include poverty, inequality unemployment, low per capita income, among others. The “unusual suspects” encompasses politics, which is a reflection of aberrant behaviours such as nepotism, sectionalism, election-rigging, bad governance, corruption, thuggery, hooliganism, among others.

The implementation strategies to achieve the national security policy objectives of Nigeria seem to have neglected the role of domestic (internal) factors capable of affecting effective implementation. Also, the implementation strategies may have equally neglected the fact that domestic or internal factors could lead to conflicts in the state and unresolved conflicts can subsequently metamorphosed to security challenges in the country. The above assertion is true because as Bassegy rightly explains:

...containment or management of conflict entails an understanding of its nature before we can deal effectively with it intellectually, emotionally, and behaviourally.... Structural analysis of conflict, violence and warfare focus on how the organization of society shape action... (Bassegy, 2007).

The inability of the implementation strategies of the national security policy to reduce the vulnerability of citizens in Nigeria obviously compounded the security situation in the country. Ultimately, these challenges require paradigm shift which some scholars have recommended to the government. This paradigm shift may be akin to the continuous call for adoption of integrative approach in the formulation and implementation of national security policy by African states. This appears to be the global trend in security management by modern states which appears to be elusive in some African states like Nigeria.

Nigeria and Internal Security Challenges. Case Studies

Nigeria as a sovereign state has witnessed several security challenges that emanated from her internal political environment. The country has been under siege for some years largely due to militancy and act of terrorism perpetuated by some individuals against the state. However, the most serious security challenges witnessed in Nigeria between 1999-2015 are presented in table 5 below:

Table 5:

Major security threats to the Nigerian state between 2001-2011

S/N	Security threat	Year	Political zone
1	Niger Delta crises	1999-2009	South – South
2	Kidnapping	2007-2015	South-East, South-South and South-West
3	Jos crises	1999-2015	North-Central
4	Boko Haram crises	2009-2015	North-West, North-East and North-central

Source: Nwagbobo’s field survey, 2015

Table 5 presents the major sources of security threats not only to the corporate existence of Nigeria, but also the general performance of the Nigerian economy between

1999-2015. It is imperative to note that some of the security threats like Niger Delta crises and Jos crises were in existence before 1999. The above table shows that the entire Nigerian state was engulfed by security problems, although the magnitude differs from one geo-political zone to another. The country's threat perception could best be understood if elaborately examined:

Niger Delta crises

During the colonial period, the areas hitherto referred to as Niger Delta were part of the Eastern Region of Nigeria which came into being in 1951 (one of the three regions, and later one of the four regions). This region comprises of several ethnic groups. They include, the people from colonial Calabar and Ogoja Divisions which are the present Ogoja, Annang, Ibibio, Oron, the Efik, Ijaw and Igbos as the majority. Thus, the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon (NCNC) was the ruling party in the region (Niger Delta Archive of News, 2011). However, the NCNC latter become National Congress of Nigerian Citizens shortly after Western Cameroon decided to separate from Nigeria. Thus, the ruling party of Eastern Nigeria did not seek to preclude the separation but encouraged it. The Niger Delta is a very densely populated region and is sometimes called the Oil Rivers. This is because, the area was once a major producer of palm oil. Thus, the area was British Oil River Protectorate from 1885 until 1893 when it was expanded and become the Niger Coast Protectorate (Niger Delta Development Commission, 2010).

The Niger Delta as now defined officially by the Nigerian Government extends about 70, 000km and makes up 7.5% Nigeria's land mass. Historically and cartographically, it consists of present day Bayelsa, Delta and Rivers State. In 2000, Obasanjo's regime included Abia, Akwa-Ibom, Cross River, Edo, Imo and Ondo State in the region (Dafinone, 2008). The region comprises of about 31 million people of more than 50 ethnic groups. They include the Bini, Efik, Ibibio, Annang, Oron, Ijaw, Itsekiri, Isoko, Urhobo, Ukwaani, Kalabari and several others. However, the linkage between resource and conflict is exemplified in the Niger Delta region of Nigeria. Thus, the region is richly endowed with crude oil deposits both in onshore and offshore. This has made the region the centre of international controversy over devastating pollution, ecocide, kleptocracy and human right violation, in which the Royal Dutch Shell has severally been implicated (Mathiason, 2009).

Admittedly, before the discovery of oil in 1956, the main-stay of the local economy of the people in the region was fishing and farming. These occupations have been dislocated by oil exploitation and exploration. This pathetic situation partly explains factors responsible for perennial conflicts and crisis over oil resources in the Niger Delta. However, some observers (Terminski, 2003; Wale, 2009; Andrew 2009), have bluntly argued that the role of oil in conflicts and crises in the Niger Delta is paradoxical. This is because, while the multinational oil companies and the Nigerian state enjoyed the revenue accruing from oil exploitation, the communities in the Niger Delta were persuaded to endure its consequences such as oil spillage, gas flaring and several forms of ecological disasters (Ayodele & Sotola, 2008). This assertion is further corroborated by Idoko who posited that:

...the state is scarcely concerned about the prospects of good life for the people of the Niger Delta, neither is the state really interested in enduring peace and development of the region... there is no doubt that the Nigerian state has always believed in the use of force to reign on "trouble makers" in the Niger Delta which makes it less surprising that the federal government...maintains an occupation force with the Niger Delta territory... (Idoko, 2008).

The implication of the ecological problems posed by oil exploitation on the lives and economy of the people coerced many communities, non-state actors and most recently militia groups to protest against the federal government and the multinational oil companies operating in the region (Oladesu, 2008). They used both constitutional and unconstitutional means to draw attention to injustice of successive governments to the plights of the region since 1960.

In response, government resorted to the adoption of repressive policy and the sinister tactics of playing one community against the other rather than addressing critical developmental challenges confronting the people. This was a deliberate approach of instigated and intensified inter and intra-communal conflicts in the Niger Delta region (Human Right Watch, 2002). Thus, the deliberate use of force by the federal government of Nigeria to address a clear case of injustice and marginalization of the people was at its climax following the extra-judicial killing of Ken Saro-Wiwa and nine Ogoni leaders by the Abacha's regime (Ododo, 2010). Thus, this singular action by Abacha's administration was condemned not only by Nigerians, but also the international community. Consequently, the international community further expressed her disapproval by imposing several sanctions on the Nigerian state during the period.

Indeed, the inability of the federal government, especially during the military era to address the root causes of agitation (environmental problems, poverty, unemployment, inequality, lack of basic amenities, etc), in the Niger Delta region, resulted to the proliferation of armed militia groups causing tension as well as the militarization of nearly the entire region. This posture was spearheaded by Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), founded by Ken Saro-Wiwa.

The agitation continued without reasonable policy direction by the government until the Odi Massacre of 1999. This extra-judicial action by Obasanjo-led administration claimed the lives of over 10,000 people including women and children according to unofficial sources. This ugly incidence happened barely five years after the execution of Environmental and Minority Right Activist, Ken Saro-Wiwa and 9 others. Thus, Saro-Wiwa and his kinsmen were killed, following their alleged role in the killing of four Ogoni Chiefs. The alleged action by Saro-Wiwa and his group was based on their conviction that those four Ogoni Chiefs were collaborating with the government and Shell to subvert their efforts toward addressing the fundamental issues such as neglect, marginalization and injustice (Aderoju, 2008). The hardship the above social malaise have caused to the lives of an average Niger Delta indigene is put to perspective by Mitee who painfully explains that:

The fundamental problem of the Niger Delta still remains the challenges posed by the very harsh environment which made development most challenging and resulted in the criminal developmental neglect of the region... (Mitee, 2009).

The trajectory of the crisis in the Niger Delta is understandable from the point of view of the inability of the government to provide basic amenities and infrastructural development for the people. This sorry situation is compounded by the economic dislocation occasioned by oil exploitation and exploration activities in the region. Thus, it is the politicization of these issues that culminated into the struggle for resource control and consequent militancy in the Niger Delta region (Amaizu, 2008). This point is well reticulated in the Ogoni Bill of Rights, the Kaima Declaration and other protest documents as deliberate struggle to compel government to address the perceived neglect and poor condition of the Niger Delta people.

However, several intervention institutions and programmes initiated and implemented by the government such as the Oil Mineral Producing Area Development Commission (OMPADEC) and Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC), to address the problem of the Niger Delta undoubtedly performed below expectations. Consequently, the abysmal failures of these institutional mechanisms established to dose tension in the region coerced the government to resort to other measures to bring about enduring peace in the region. This was after several lost of revenues by the Federal Government from the oil sector. The lost of resources that amounted to billions of dollar was largely due to the activities of the militants who forced oil companies to closed-down and the spate to kidnapping of expatriate oil workers in the region. These armed militias also engaged in illegal bunkering of oil resources and destruction of oil installations in the region.

Consequently, these illegal actions have grossly reduced federal government's revenue from oil sector, especially between 1999 and 2008. Thus, table 6 below provides useful insights into the reduction of oil production and lost of revenue by the Federal Government following conflicts and crises in the Niger Delta region:

Table 6:
Nigeria's crude oil production from 1999-2008

S/N	Year	Production	Change
1	1999	2,129.86	-1.10%
2	2000	2,165.00	1.65%
3	2001	2,256.16	4.21%
4	2002	2,117.86	-6.13%
5	2003	2,275.00	7.42%
6	2004	2,328.96	2.37%
7	2005	2,627.44	12.82%
8	2006	2,439.86	-7.14%
9	2007	2,349.64	-3.70%
10	2008	2,165.44	1.98%

Source: United State Energy Information Administration (2009).

The above table indicates that oil production in Nigeria between 1999-2008 was not stable. It was low in 1999, but slightly increased in 2000 and 2004 respectively. However, the 2002 witnessed sharp decline in production. Between 2003-2007, the outputs from oil production in the country was not constant. The situation was exacerbated in 2008 as evidenced in table 6 above. However, the rise and fall in the production of oil in Nigeria between 1999-2008 was largely due to frequent conflicts and crises in the Niger Delta region.

The ugly developments in the Niger Delta which seemed to have negatively impacted on the Nigeria's economy ultimately became a source of worry to the Federal Government. Hence, the Federal Government decisively adopted another policy measure to reduce the spate of insecurity in the region. This decision resulted to the application of minimal force to ensure that militants drop their crimes and hostilities against the government and the people of the region.

Towards the end of 2008, the Federal Government launched a massive military crackdown on militants (Amaizu, 2008). Thus, military patrolled waters, hunted for militants, searched all civilian boats for weapons and raided numerous hideouts in the region. Also, on May 15, 2009 (the following year), a military operation undertaken by the Joint Task Force

(JTF), was put in place by the Federal Government against members of the Movement for Emancipation of Niger Delta (MEND), and their affiliates in the region (Onoyume, 2008).

Paradoxically, rather than these measures to address the challenges of insecurity in the Niger Delta, the situation led to incessant kidnapping of not only the foreign oil workers, but also the indigenes and other residents in the region. In view of the worsening security situation in the region, the Federal Government adopted another civil and tactful approach in resolving the poor security situation in the Niger Delta. Thus, on June 26, 2009, the Federal Government under the leadership of Late President Umaru Yar' Adua, announced the granting of Amnesty and unconditional pardon to militants in the Niger Delta (Rotimi, 2009). However, the militants were given between August 6, to October 4, 2009 to surrender their weapons to the federal government in return for training and rehabilitation.

Hence, during the 60 days period, the militants led their groups to surrender their weapons which included rocket-propelled grenades, guns, explosives, ammunitions, gunboats, among others. This strategy adopted to end hostilities in the Niger Delta by the Federal Government, significantly increased Nigeria's oil production and consequently enhanced Federal Government's revenue from oil sector between 2009-2011. Thus, table 7 below shades more lights to this development:

Table 7:
Nigeria's crude oil production between 2009-2011

S/N	Year	Production	Change
1	2009	2,208.31	1.98%
2	2010	2,455.26	11.18%
3	2011	2,525.29	2.85%

Source: United States Energy Information Administration (2011).

From table 7 above, it is evident that oil production increased significantly from 2009 when Amnesty was granted to the militants in the Niger Delta region by the Federal Government of Nigeria. This increase was phenomenal considering the amount of money the country lost following the conflicts, hostilities and crises in the Niger Delta region before the implementation of Amnesty programme by the federal government. Ultimately, the granting of Amnesty to militants in the region and their rehabilitation have not only enhanced Federal Government's revenue generation from the oil sector, but also reduced the rate of crises in the region. Unfortunately, the Niger Delta crises had a spillover effects in some states in the South-East geo-political zone of Nigeria. The crisis and their attendant kidnapping of foreign oil workers for payment of ransom in the Niger Delta, were quickly emulated by some youths in the South-East zone of Nigeria, especially for economic gains.

Kidnapping in the South-East Zone of Nigeria

Kidnapping is one of the criminal activities that posed serious security threat to the Nigerian State, particularly between 2007-2015. According to Chukwurah (2011), kidnapping is conceived as the act of illegally taking someone away and keeping him as a prisoner for the purpose of receiving ransom (money) in return. Historically, kidnapping in the South-East zone and some other parts of Nigeria, could be traced to the hostilities, conflicts, crises and violence in the Niger Delta region (Igbokwe, 2009).

The challenges posed by this criminal dimension of Nigeria's perennial security checklist painted negative image of the country nationally and internationally. This ugly situation explains why Arizona-Ogwu, a Nigerian residing in the United States of America

bluntly described the attitudes of the Federal Governments of Nigeria toward the menace of crime as follows:

Owing to government cold-feet attitude to certain crimes in Nigeria, there is an outcome of thousands of cases signifying the brutality wrought on the innocent Nigerians with the help of local collaborators. Beside kidnappings and murders, there are millions of cases of torture, rape, arson, looting and other crimes (Arizona-Ogwu, 2010).

In the South-East geo-political zone, kidnapping activities were initially targeted at prominent indigenes and residents of the region. The incidence of kidnapping became more pervasive shortly after the 2007 General Elections in the country. This is partly because, the youths who were used as political thugs by some inordinate and selfish politicians during the 2007 General Elections subsequently engaged in kidnapping as a means of livelihood after the elections (Nwosu, 2011). The violent nature of kidnapping and its socio-economic implication on the economy of the South – East zone of Nigeria are enormous. Thus, this menace was pervasive in some states and towns in the region as evidenced from table 8 below:

Table 8:

States and towns with widely reported cases of kidnapping in the South-East Geo-political Zone of Nigeria

S/N	State	Town mostly affected	Other area affected
1	Abia	Aba, Umuahia,	Semi-urban areas and many rural areas across the state
2	Anambra	Onitsha, Nnewi	Rural areas across the state
3	Ebonyi	Abakiliki	Rural areas across the state
4	Imo	Owerri, Orlu, Mbaise	Rural areas across the state
5	Enugu	-	-

Source: Nwagboso's field survey, 2015.

From table 8 above, kidnapping was a lucrative business among the youths in the South-East Zone. This is because, this menace virtually occurred in all major commercial towns and rural areas in the region. It is only in Enugu State that the incidence of kidnapping was not reported during the reviewed period. This could be as a result of the political will and determination of the Enugu State Government to deal decisively with any identified criminal group in the state. This according to some public analysts is based on the recognition of the Enugu State Government that no meaningful development could be achieved in an environment characterized by insecurity.

Specifically, the menace of kidnapping was phenomenal in Abia state, especially in Aba metropolis (the commercial nerve of the state), and its environs. This criminal activity brought tension in the commercial city and even compelled many families to abandon their residence (Eke, 2011). Besides individuals and families that ran away from Aba metropolis for security reasons, some manufacturing companies relocated to peaceful states like Enugu for their businesses. This ugly incidence may have adversely impacted on the economy of Abia State in particular and Nigeria in general (Akinrinade, 2011). This situation further resulted to loss of jobs by some residents of Aba metropolis, thereby increasing unemployment rate in Abia State in particular and Nigeria in general. The manufacturing companies that relocated from Aba metropolis to more peaceful states due to kidnapping and security challenges are presented in table 9 below:

Table 9:

Major manufacturing companies in Aba metropolis that relocated to other states due to kidnapping and security challenges.

S/N	Manufacturing company	States and towns relocated	Reason for relocation
1	Nigerian Breweries PLC	Enugu State	Security problems in Aba.
2	Guinness Nigerian PLC	Edo State (Benin)	Security problems in Aba
3	Seven-Up Bottling Ltd	Enugu	Security problems in Aba
4	PZ PLC	Enugu	Security problems and frequent kidnapping of its staff in Aba
5	International Equitable	Enugu	Security problems and low profit margin

Source: Nwaboso's field survey, 2015

From table 9 above, a total of five (5) manufacturing companies shut down and relocated to Enugu and Edo State due to kidnapping/high rate of security problem in Aba metropolis. This was largely due to frequent kidnapping of their staff and the impact of this menace on general economic performance of their businesses. Thus, the staff of the above companies who were kidnapped allegedly paid huge sum of money to 'kidnappers' as ransom before they were released. According to some residents in Aba metropolis, many staff of these companies that relocated, especially casual workers, lost their jobs between 2008-2015.

Besides the relocation of these major manufacturing companies, some small and medium scale business operators ran away from Aba and its environs due to high incidence of kidnapping. Thus, the increasing rate of this menace also resulted to several foiled attempts to kidnap the Executive Governor of Abia State, Chief Theodore Orji in 2008 (Nwogu, 2008). From 2008-2015, several prominent men and women in Aba as well as its environs were kidnapped for ransom. This includes political office-holders in Abia State, Traditional Rulers, business-men and women, and civil and public servants. This pathetic situation is most likely to impact negatively on the economy of Abia State, Nigeria's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), in Nigeria.

The menace of kidnapping in Abia State got to a crescendo when some school children were kidnapped in Aba in 2010. However, this singular act and consequent kidnapping of "common man" compelled all the commercial banks in Aba metropolis to shut down for several days. Prior to this decisive action by the banks, many of them had been severally robbed by armed gunmen. The commercial banks that shut down for weeks in 2010 due to kidnapping and high rate of insecurity in Aba metropolis is presented in table 10 below:

Table 10:

Commercial banks that shut down for some weeks in Aba metropolis in 2010 due to kidnapping and high rate of insecurity

S/N	Commercial bank	Reason to shut down
1	First Bank PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping of their staff and frequent bank robbery
2	Union Bank PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping to their staff and frequent bank robbery

3	Eco bank PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping of their staff and frequent bank robbery
4	First City Monument Bank PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping of their staff and frequent bank robbery
5	Intercontinental Bank PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping of their staff and frequent bank robbery
6	United Bank for Africa PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping of their staff and frequent bank robbery
7	Guarantee Trust Bank PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping of their staff and frequent bank robbery
8	Fin-Bank PLC	Insecurity in Aba, kidnapping of their staff and frequent bank robbery

Source: Nwagboso's field survey, 2015

From table 10 above, the commercial banks which are adjudged as critical nexus between the citizens and economic activities in the state were forced to shut down by 'kidnappers' and other criminal gangs in Aba metropolis in 2010. This situation resulted not only to lost of revenues to the banks, but also to the residents of Aba and the government throughout the period. This pathetic trend also impacted negatively on the economy of Nigeria, especially during the said period.

Worse still, kidnapping in the South-East Geo-political Zone also impacted negatively on social relations as some victims were kidnapped during church services, village/town hall meetings and at market square. This resulted to the decisions of some illustrious sons and daughters of many rural communities from the zone to stay away from their villages during Christmas and festive periods (Soriwei, 2011). The implication of this was that the rural drivellers could not speak with 'one voice' on community development programmes, let alone repose confidence on one another. They were suspicious of each other and could not come together as a people to articulate development programmes for the general well-being of their areas.

To redress the challenges posed by kidnapping in the south East Geo political Zone, the Federal Government of Nigeria, on passionate request of the Abia State government, deployed soldiers to Aba Metropolis. Thus, Okoli (2009) shades more lights to the above bold step by the Government.

... Governor Theodore Orji of Abia State formally invited the Army to the state to assist in the fight against crime and criminals, especially kidnappers. The Governor said the menace of kidnapping seemed to have overwhelmed the police...

Consequently, the action of government in mobilizing the army to flush 'kidnappers' in Aba and its environs minimized the reported cases of this menace in the area. This was largely due to intensive attacks launched by the army at the identified hideouts of 'kidnappers' in Ukwa-West Local Government Area of Abia State (Sampson, 2010).

It is imperative to note that several other criminal activities also threatened the security and economy of the south-East Geo-political Zone in particular and Nigeria in general during the reviewed period. Such criminal activities include murder, rape, ritual killings, robbery, human trafficking, politically- motivated killings and assassination of prominent men and women in the zone (Ajani, 2010). Thus, the above criminal activities impacted negatively

not only on Nigeria's Gross Domestic product (GDP), but also crippled most economic activities in the South-East Geo-political Zone (Agboso, 2011).

Jos Crises

The Jos crises is another major internal security threat that appeared difficult for the National Security Policy of Nigeria to address during the period under review. The Jos crises is a continuation of the violence that followed the November, 2008 Jos North Local Government election (Audu, 2011). Historically, Jos is the capital of Plateau State of Nigeria. The city of Jos has witnessed several sectarian, ethnic and political clashes among which were the September, 2011 and April 2004 conflicts that resulted to the imposition of state of emergency on Plateau State by the Obasanjo's administration.

However, the ostensible dispute as argued by some observers is over the 'rights' of the indigene Berom/Anaguta/Afizere(BAA) group and the rival claims of the Hausa-Fulani settlers to land, power and resources (Nakande, 2011). To some analysts, the immediate and remote causes of Jos crises prior to November 2008 crisis has been politicized along sectarian and ethnic lines (Akpan, 2011). Those inclined to the ethnic thesis believe that the crisis is a classic case of ethnic cleansing. They further argued that the Berom, Anaguta, Afizere and the Hausa/ Fulani, laying claim to pre-eminence over one another is the main cause of the crises in Jos (Akpan, 2011). The above position is further supported by the Crisis Group Report on Jos crises. According to the Report:

Indigene – settler conflicts are not new to Nigeria... the Jos crisis is the result of failure to amend the constitution to privilege broad based citizenship over exclusive indigene status and ensure that residency rather than indigeneity determines citizens' rights... constitutional change is an important step to diffuse indigene- settler rivalries that continue to undermine security... (Crisis Group Report, 2011).

Thus, the indigene principle or indigeneity (that is local origin), means that some groups control power and resources in the state or local government areas, while others, particularly those assumed to have migrated for different reason are completely excluded. This situation gives rise to both grievances and fierce political competition which too often lead to interference, agitation, conflicts, violence and insecurity in Jos. The Jos crises which have attracted mixed reactions from both local and international observers mostly occurred in some local government areas as presented in table 11 below:

Table 11:
Local Government Areas where the Jos crises mostly occurred

S/N	Local government	Group involved in the conflict
1	Jos North	Christian and Muslim adherents
2	Jos South	Christian and Muslim adherents
3	Bakin Ladi	Christian and Muslim adherents
4	Bassa	Christian and Muslim adherents
5	Riyom	Christian and Muslim adherents

Source: Nwagboso's field survey 2015

From table 11 above, it is observed that the crises in Jos are between the dominant religious sects in the area (Christianity and Islam). The crises mostly occurred in areas like Jos North, Jos South, Bakin Ladi, Bassa and Riyom. The ugly and annoying posture of the Federal and State Governments in resolving the problem in Jos have further attracted mixed reactions

from Nigeria citizens and international community. As Human Right Watch Report rightly observed:

... the discriminatory policies lies at the root of much of the inter-communal violence in Nigeria... with these policies, no-indigenes are openly denied the right to compete for government jobs and academic scholarships... in Jos, Kuru and Karama, members of the largely Muslim Hausa ethnic groups are classified as non- indigenes though may have lived there for several generations... government should take concrete steps to end the discriminatory policies that treat certain groups as second – class citizens... (Human Right Watch Report, 2010).

Specifically, the unresolved crises in Jos have claimed numerous lives of Nigerians and property worth billions of dollars from 2001 to 2011. The crises which seem to have defied all manner of intervention by the federal and state governments, as well as the non- government organizations (NGOs), have resulted to frequent attacks on Christians by some Muslims (Obateru and Omonobi, 2010). Indeed, between 2001-2011, over 10,000 Christians were slaughtered during the Jos crises. In 2010 crisis for instance, about 500 Christians lost their lives (Oladoyinbo, 2010).

Indeed, the Jos crises have resulted to unimaginable confrontations, killings, bombings and other forms of violence on the residents. The magnitude and wanton destruction of lives and property partly explains why the Late Terror Master (Gaddafi of Libya), once suggested that Nigeria should be divided into two religious lines (Islam and Christianity). This suggestion was in consideration of frequent attacks on Christians by the Muslim community. This pathetic situation as Sunday tribune editorial rightly noted has resulted to the emergence of a group known as Islamic assailants. This group has continued to cause tension in Jos, displacing Nigerians and setting houses and property of the people ablaze. The Editorial Report further explains:

In Jos, conflict reoccurs in every narrowing cycles... deadly riots rocked the city in 1994, 2001, 2008 and two months ago... in January 2010, the current conflict is said to have started in reappraisal for the destruction that occurred in January... there has been reports of children and the elderly been particularly targeted by roving gangs armed with guns and machetes... (The Editorial Report of Sunday Tribune Newspaper, 2011).

Admittedly, the Jos crises have raised serious questions on the unity and development of Nigeria. Thus, available evidence has shown that the crises in Jos has been fought on sectarian lines and this ugly trend is traceable to 'sour relationship' between Christian and Muslim communities in some parts of plateau State. The understanding of this relationship is pertinent because, as Human Right Watch Report rightly argues:

... Jos lies on the border between Nigeria's Muslim minority North and Christian Majority South. Access to land resources is often determined by whether one is a native or indigene... Jos is historically Christian City... settlers are most often Muslims from the North... (Human Right Watch Report, July 10, 2010).

The above observation by Human Right Watch reinforces the result of some studies on Jos crises. According to Crisis Group, the problem in Jos borders on citizenships status. The Crisis Group bluntly argued that:

...because the settlers are almost entirely Muslim and the indigenous people are predominantly Christians, struggle over land ownership, economic resources and political control tend to be expressed not just in ethnic but also religious terms... since 2010, security has further deteriorated in Jos because of terror attacks and suicide bombings against churches and security targets by suspected militants of Boko Haram... the Islamic group is responsible for an unprecedented wave of terrorist attacks in the North... (Crisis Group: Africa Report No. 196, 2011).

From the above premise, it becomes imperative to rhetorically query why the Federal Government appears to be reluctant to tackle the root causes of the problem in Jos and to prosecute those perpetrating these dastardly crimes in the area. Also, why has the Federal Government perpetually kept quiet in addressing the problem of citizenship within the Nigerian political space? Why has the Federal Government and Plateau State seem to have abysmally failed to implement the recommendations of several committees set-up to find lasting solutions to the crisis in Jos?

Thus, the reaction of Hilary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, provides useful insights to credible answers to the above questions. As she fearlessly argued:

...the Nigerian political leaders failed to live by examples, thereby increasing the radicalization of many young Nigerians... fierce and unregulated political competition characterized by ethnic mobilization and violence, coupled with poor governance and rampant corruption, have severally exacerbated ethnic, religious and regional fault lines (Crisis Group Report, No. 196, 2011, quoting Hilary Clinton).

Therefore, it is strongly argued by some analysis that the Jos crises require national and local solutions. Thus, constitutional provisions by virtue of their ambiguity over terms such as "indigene" (which the amended 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria failed to define satisfactorily), and "residency" for accessing citizenship rights, have done little to clarify the situation. Hence, the Nigeria's current implementation of its citizenship or national question appear to be grossly inadequate and flawed. This situation as some analysts have argued requires the collaboration and political will of both the executive and legislative arms of government at the national level, especially to articulate implementable policy strategies to resolve the problem in Jos.

Boko Haram Crises

... what is going on is a new phase in this nation. Neither Nigerians, the government nor the security agencies is used to a situation where innocent citizens will be attacked for a cause that is clearly difficult to reason with or to explain... the Islamic fundamental group has claimed responsibility for attacks on government and private institutions, including the suicide bombings of the Police Headquarters and the United Nations (UN) House in Abuja... many

people were killed in these attacks (Ojibor, 2011; quoting the minister of information in Nigeria, Hon Labaran Maku).

The activities of Boko Haram as a terrorist group in Nigeria have been described in several ways by public analysts and observers. To some, Boko Haram is simply a group of people committed to the propagation of the Prophet Muhammed teachings and Jihad in Nigeria. To others, Boko Haram is a socio-political fundamentalist group that rejects western education and culture. Also, others see this group as Islamic movement which strongly opposes man-made laws. However Boko Haram is conceptualized, available evidence indicates that it is Muslim sect that seeks to abolish the secularity of the Nigerian State and establish Sharia Law in Nigeria (Alaneme, 2011).

Etymologically, the term 'Boko Haram' is derived from Hausa word 'Boko' meaning 'Animist', western, otherwise non-islamic education; and the Arabic word 'Haram' figuratively meaning 'sin' or literally forbidding' (Olugbode, 2010). The summary of the above descriptions is that Boko Haram as a terrorist group abhors western education, culture and the general behaviours of Muslim faithfuls, especially the elites who promote western ethics. For this group, western education, culture, modern science and their related-terms, are not only forbidding, but also sacrilege (Dunia, 2010). Comically, the group asserts that the belief that the world is 'spherical' or 'ovat' in shape is contrary to Islam and should be rejected along "Darwinism evolution theory" which asserts that rain comes from water evaporated by sun.

Historically, the Boko Haram group was founded in 2002 in Maiduguri by Utaz Mohammed Yusuf (Ikuomola, 2011). In 2004, this terrorist group moved to Kanama in Yobe, where it sets up a base called 'Afghanistan'. The 'Afghanistan' therefore, became the group's base to launch terror and frequent attack on near-by police outposts and killing of police officers (Awowole, 2010). However, the founder of this terrorist group (Utaz Mohammed Yusuf), was hostile to democracy and secular education system operative in Nigeria and supported by some Northern elites. This partly explains why he vowed that the war he began in 2002 would ultimately change the political, economic and educational systems in Nigeria; a dream not realized till his gruesome death in 2009.

The Boko Haram does not mix with the local people in the Northern part of Nigeria. Available literatures have demonstrated that lot of members of this terrorist group that speak Arabic come from neighbouring Chad (Ojiabor, 2011; Obi, 2011; Anofi, 2010). This undoubtedly is as a result of the group's strong belief in the Koranic phrase which says "Anyone who is not governed by what Allah has revealed is among the transgressors". Thus, whether western education which majority of elites from the Northern Nigeria have acquired was not revealed by the 'Allah' is entirely a subject hotly debated in Nigeria's political space. Consequently, the Boko Haram terrorist group has launched several attacks against the Nigeria state. The attacks were mostly launched in some specific states and cities as presented in table 12 below:

Table 12:

States and cities in Nigeria where Boko Haram mostly launched their attacks between 2009-2011.

S/N	State/city	Geo-graphical area	Targets
1	Borno State (Maiduguri)	North-East	Residents and government institutions
2	Buachi State (Bauchi Town)	North-East	Residents and government institutions
3	Yobe State(Damaturu)	North- East	Residents and government institutions
4	Kano State (Kano)	North- West	Residents and government institutions
5	Kaduna State (Kaduna)	North- West	Residents and government institutions
6	Plateau state (Jos)	North- Central	Residents and government institutions
7	Abuja (FCT)	North- Central	Residents and government institutions
8	Niger	North-Central	Residents and government institutions

Source: Nwagboso's field survey, 2015

From table 12 above, it is evident that Boko Haram terrorist group attacked some states and major cities in the Northern part of Nigeria, especially between 2009-2015. From the table above, it is clear that the three geo-political zone of the Northern Nigeria such as North – East, North - West and North – Central were attacked by members this group between 2009 – 2015. The attacks launched by this group in the above states and cities were mostly on residents, government institutions, security formation (police stations), and international organization(s) such as the UN building in Abuja.

However, the magnitude and severity of the attacks by boko haram terrorist group are greater in some states/ cities than others in the same northern part of Nigeria. According to Champion Newspaper Report of June 12, 2011, it is estimated that Borno state records the highest rate of casualties (2,400), Yobe (1,950), Buachi (1,720), FCT Abuja (1,510), Kaduna

(1,230), plateau (1,200), Kano (850), Niger (520). This is further elucidated in fig.2 below:




Fig.2: States/cities in the Northern part of Nigeria with high rate of attacks from the Boko Haram terrorist group.

From fig.2 above, it is observed that the state that received the highest rate of terrorist attack from Boko Haram between 2009- 2015 was Borno State. The reason could be that the group was formed in Maiduguri which is the Borno State capital. The next State that received severe attacks from this group as evidenced in fig.2 above, was Yobe State, especially Damaturu. The reason could be as a result that Boko Haram moved from Maiduguri where it was originally formed to Yobe State where it established its operational base. As stated earlier, it was from its operational base in Yobe State that it began to launch incessant attacks on police officers and police stations in the area. Thus, other states and cities in the North that received attacks from Boko Haram could simply be as a result of the arguments among observers that Boko Haram is a terrorist agenda of some groups from the North to pull down the secularity status of the Nigerian State.

It is pertinent to note that Boko Haram promotes a version of Islam which makes it 'Haram' or forbidden for Muslims to participate in any political or social activities with Western States and their allies. This includes voting in elections, wearing shirts and trousers or receiving a secular education (Ajayi, 2011). The activities of the Boko Haram terrorist group constituted serious security challenges to effective implementation of the National Security Policy of Nigeria. Thus, between 2009 –2015, the group allegedly killed so many residents in Nigeria and destroyed property of both the government and citizens. The criminal activities of this group and their implications on implementation of the National Security Policy of Nigeria is put to clear perspective by some scholars who bluntly argued that:

... the recent surge of the Boko Haram through series of bombings that have killed several innocent Nigerian citizens is a serious breach and challenge to national security. The bombing of the United Nations building in Abuja on Friday 26th August 2011, killing not less than 22 people and wounding scores of others has further demonstrated not only the wickedness of the group... these bombings are serious crimes against the Nigerian State and threaten national security... (Ekanem et al., 2011).

The activities of Boko Haram which has raised critical questions among investors on the safety of their investments in Nigeria range from killing of innocent Nigerians/residents,

raping of women, to indiscriminate bombing of major cities, churches, police stations and public gatherings, especially in the Northern parts of Nigeria. As some analysts argued, these criminal activities have not only given Nigeria poor image in international political arena, but also impacted negatively on the economy of the Nigerian State. This is evidenced from series of attacks launched against the Nigerian State by the group as presented in table 13 below:

Table 13:
Major terrorist attacks on the Nigerian State and her Citizens by Boko Haram Group between 2009-2015.

S/N	Institutions/Individuals attacked	Date	Death toll
1	Attack on some members of the Nigerian police force in Maiduguri	July 2009	800
2	Attack on Nigerian prisons services in Yobe State	July 30,2009	About 150
3	Attacked Dada Alemden ward in Maiduguri	July 2010	4
4	Attacked Nigerian Prisons Service Bauchi and freed over 700 inmates	September 7, 2010	Causalities not officially reported
5	Bombed a market in Maiduguri	December 10, 2010	About 200
6	Assassination of gubernatorial of ANPP and five others in Borno State	January 28, 2011	6
7	Bombed a polling booth in Maiduguri during the 2011 General elections	April 1, 2011	Not officially reported
8	Bombed the Office of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Maiduguri office	April 15, 2011	About 50
9	Killing of Muslim cleric in Maiduguri	April 20, 2011	1
10	Attacked Nigerian Prisons Services, Yola and freed 14 inmates	April 22, 2011	Not officially reported
11	Embarked on sporadic bombings in some parts of the Northern Nigeria	May 29, 2011, September 6, 2013 and December 14, 2014.	14
12	Bombing of the United Nations Building in Abuja	August 26, 2011	About 20 people
13	Bombing of the headquarters of the Nigerian Police Force, Abuja	June 17, 2011	Not officially reported
14	Bombing of drug shop in Maiduguri	June 27, 2011	2
15	Bombing of a church in Suleja, Niger State	July 19, 2011 and August 2014	Not officially reported
16	Bombing of a church at Madella in Niger State on Christmas Day	December 25, 2011	About 36
17	Adoption of Chibok School Girls in Borno State	2013	About 400
18	Sporadic bombing of many parts of the Northern Nigeria.	From May 29, 2015 to August 12, 2015	Uncountable death tolls

Source: Nwagboso's field survey, 2015

From table 13 above, the Boko Haram group has launched several attacks against the citizens, residents and the Nigeria State, particularly between 2009 and 2015. Thus, majority

of the group's sinister activities have largely centered on the security formations, especially in the Northern States of Borno, Yobe, Bauchi, Plateau, Kano, Kaduna, Sokoto and Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja. These attacks resulted to several death tolls in the country and further sent wrong signals against the Nigerian State outside her political environment.

It is imperative to note that the Boko Haram group executed other terrorists attacks against the Nigerian State apart from those presented in table 14 above. Also, some of the criminal attacks by the group against the Nigerian State and its citizens make it difficult to have accurate data of the activities of this anarchist movement against the Nigerian State and her citizens. Indeed, one of the most painful terrorist activities of this group, is the adoption of Chibok School Girls from their school into Sanbisa Forest in Maodugiri in 2013. The search for the release of these school girls has been very difficult.

Beside the security challenges posed by the Niger Delta crises, Jos crises, kidnapping in the South-East and Boko Haram terrorist group in some parts of the Northern Nigeria, the Nigerian political space also witnessed other forms of security threats or what could best be described as criminality. Some of the security threats were violent in nature like the case of rape, armed robbery, ritual killings, murder etc, while others like HIV/AIDS, cholera, Ebola Virus Disease were non-violent. These security threats appear to have adversely impacted on the Nigerian economy, the image of the country in the global arena and social relations among the Nigerian citizens. The magnitude and severity of these crimes differ sharply from major security challenges witnessed in Nigeria between 1999-2015, such as Niger Delta Crises, Jos Crises, Kidnapping and Boko Haram Crises. From the above premise, it becomes imperative to rhetorically query why the Federal Government of Nigeria appears reluctant to tackle the root causes of Security challenges in Nigeria. For instance, why has the government failed to address the problem in Jos and to prosecute those perpetrating those dastardly crimes in the area? Also, why has the Federal Government perpetually kept quiet in addressing the problem of citizenship within the Nigerian political space? Why has the Federal Government and Plateau State seem to have abysmally failed to implement the recommendations of several committees set-up to find lasting solutions to the crises in Jos?

Thus, the reaction of Hilary Clinton, the US Secretary of State, provides useful insights to credible answers to the above questions. As she fearlessly argued:

...the Nigerian political leaders failed to live by examples, thereby increasing the radicalization of many young Nigerians... fierce and unregulated political competition characterized by ethnic mobilization and violence, coupled with poor governance and rampant corruption, have severally exacerbated ethnic, religious and regional fault lines (Crisis Group Report, No. 196, 2011:14).

Therefore, it is strongly argued by some analysts that the Jos crises require national and local solutions. Thus, constitutional provisions by virtue of their ambiguity over terms such as "indigene" (which the amended 1999 constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria failed to define satisfactorily), and "residency" for accessing citizenship rights, have done little to clarify the situation. Hence, the Nigerian's current implementation of its citizenship (or national) question appears to be grossly inadequate and flawed. This situation as some analysts have argued requires the collaboration and political will of both the executive and legislative arms of government at the national level, especially to articulated implementable policy strategies to resolve the problem in Jos.

Conclusion

This Paper has examined the nature of internal security problems of African States with Nigeria as a case study. However, specific emphasis was placed on some violent internal security problems that confronted the Nigerian State between 1999-2015. These man-tailored internal security problems which have undoubtedly resulted to high rate of Internally Displaced persons (IDPs), in the Nigeria's political space include the Niger Delta Crises, Jos Crises, Kidnapping in the South-East Geo-political Zone and Boko Haram Crises, particularly in the North-East part of Nigeria.

The paper argued that the persistent re-occurrence of these internal security problems and their attendant consequences on the Nigeria's economy is due largely to the weakness of the country's National Security Policy. Thus, available evidence indicated that policy makers in Nigeria abysmally failed to design implementable policies and programmes capable of mitigating the scourge of insurgency in the country. Rather than formulating a robust internal security policies and programmes capable of confronting the generational causes of insurgency such as poverty, unemployment, inequality, corruption, bad governance, weak institutional framework, among others, policy makers were only interested in the adoption of approaches and strategies to address immediate internal insurrection with the use of ad hoc security outfit (Joint Task Force).

The adoption of 'fire-brigade' approach such as the continuous use of Joint-TASK Force (JTF), to address Nigeria's internal security problem only succeeded in minimizing violent attacks on the state and her citizens, without addressing their root causes and re-occurrence.

It is, therefore, argued that policy makers need a clear understanding of the nature, causes and implications of internal security problems in Nigeria. This will enable them initiate, formulate and effectively implement people-oriented policies and programmes capable of addressing the country's high rate of internal security problems.

Recommendations

To address Nigeria's plethora of internal security challenges, the following implementable policy options are advocated:

1. Government should embark on aggressive rural development policies and programmes across the 774 Local Government Areas in Nigeria. This is pertinent because, the increasing spate of rural-urban drift occasioned by unemployment, dearth of critical social infrastructure and abject rural poverty, adversely impact on security governance and economic development in the country.
2. There is urgent need for adequate security at the rural areas in Nigeria. Hence, government should recruit more police personnel to effectively provide security at the grassroots. The recruitment of more police personnel will not only assist in adequate intelligence gathering at the rural areas, but also check-mate from the on-set, certain neglected aberrant behaviour at the grassroots which often graduate from villages, communities/ Local Government levels, to become national problems.
3. The value system in Nigeria should be re-examined and reinvigorated. The Nigerian people through families, churches, mosque, the media and the National Orientation Agency (NOA), should aggressively embark on advocacy capable of rewarding honesty, hardwork and discipline among the people. Hence, less emphasis should be placed on wealth acquisition, flamboyant lifestyle, 'winner takes all politics', among others. This measure will ultimately reduce the alarming gap between the rich and the poor (inequality), which often results to envy and insecurity in the Nigerian society.

4. Through credible electoral process, government should adopt fair and just policies and programmes capable of reducing the deliberate institutional framework which hitherto plays certain community, religion individuals or groups against others. This step will undoubtedly reduce the skirmishes in the Niger Delta and Jos, as several studies have pointed on deliberate government's posture of 'playing one group against the other'.
5. Government should resuscitate famous agricultural policies and programmes in order to create employment opportunities for the youths in the country. This is imperative because, several studies have pointed the Nigeria's high unemployment rate as one of the cardinal factors responsible for security challenges in the country.

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